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I. INTRODUCTION

"[W]ater is the basis of life ... and the foundation of civilization."' Our

dependence and consequent reverence for water have long inspired both fear of
its absence and of its excess abundance.2 Drought is a familiar biblical curse on
the Israelites. One can read in Leviticus: "I will make the sky above you as hard
as iron, and your soil as hard as bronze, so that your strength shall be spent in
vain and your land will bear no crops, and its trees no fruit.' 3 Likewise, the fear
of flood starts with the story of Noah and persists throughout history. During
the golden age of Holland, criminals were publicly placed in a glass water cage
to remind society of the imminent danger of inundation that the nation faced
should it fail to maintain the dykes that held back the North Sea.4 The end
product of this fear and respect for water's functions is the widely recognized
need for some level of state control over its use.
State control can be asserted directly or indirectly. Direct control involves state construction of water works and the distribution of water. Indirect
control limits the state to the establishment of the ground rules for private water
access and use. Societies have long concluded that water use can never simply
I

THOMAS

V.

CECH,

PRINCIPLES

OF WATER

RESOURCES:

HISTORY,

DEVELOPMENT,

MANAGEMENT, AND POLICY 2 (2001).
2
"The Babylonian god also called

Num personified the idea that water was the source of all
life, that historically the earth came forth from water, and that water was the quickening element
of all creation." MARQ DE VILLIERS, WATER: THE FATE OF OUR MOST PRECIOUS RESOURCE 51
(Mariner Books 2001).
3
Leviticus 26:19-20.
4

SIMON SCHAMA,

THE EMBARRASSMENT

OF RICHES:

AN INTERPRETATION OF DUTCH

CULTURE IN THE GOLDEN AGE 15-24 (1987).
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be a matter of individual choice and have long asserted a governmental interest
5
Few countries rely on
in how water is used and who should enjoy access to it.
a single strategy, but instead use a mix of direct and indirect controls to insure
that water is used in ways consistent with broader public objectives. The need
for state control can be traced to ancient Mesopotamia and China,6 and was initially reflected in the construction of state public works to support irrigation and
to prevent floods, and then extended to control private water use. Spain recognized the need for state control when it applied its irrigation experience in the
arid Mediterranean littoral, inherited from the Moors, 7 to the colonization of the
New World. The famous Recopilacion de leyes de los Reynos de las Indias,
which organized town planning in North and South America, included the protection of water supplies. The law provided that individuals could divert small
streams for irrigation and other uses, but that such use must be done "without
prejudice of the communal use."8
Today, the question of what system of water use entitlements and management a state should follow is becoming an increasingly important issue as
many states, especially those east of the Missouri River, are asking whether existing water allocation and management regimes are adequate to cope with numerous challenges. Such challenges range from the possibility of more frequent, if short-term, droughts to the longer-term pressures being placed on their
water resource base, as well as the growing demand for the restoration of degraded aquatic ecosystems. 9 West Virginia, along with its northern neighbor,
Pennsylvania,10 has long been a pure common law allocation state, but questions
5

FOOD & AGRIC. ORG, UNITED NATIONS, LEGIS. STUDY 73, Water, in LAW AND SUSTAINABLE

DEVELOPMENT

SINCE

Rio -

LEGAL

TRENDS

IN

AGRICULTURE

AND

NATURAL

RESOURCE

MANAGEMENT 147-61.
6

Karl Wittfogel was one of the first to draw attention to the relationship between control of

water use and the type of government organization. KARL A.

WITTFOGEL,

ORIENTAL DESPOTISM:

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TOTAL POWER (1957). Wittfogel's thesis that state control leads to
despotism has been influential, see DONALD WORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER, ARIDITY, AND

THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN WEST 22-30 (1985), but has not described the United States water
experience, and it has even been questioned as an explanation of subsequent flood control in
China. States can control rivers through extensive public works, but the cost often becomes too
high. Late imperial China was unable to bear the costs of maintaining the Yellow River system as
a result of the rise in the height of the riverbed caused by earlier public works and the fiscal and
political decay of the Qing dynasty. See RANDALL A. DODGEN, CONTROLLING THE DRAGON:
CONFUCIAN ENGINEERS AND THE YELLOW RIVER IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA (2001).

Thomas F. Glick, Irrigation and Society in Medieval Valencia, LIBR. IBERIAN RESOURCES
ONLINE, at http://ibro.uca.edu/irrigation/irrigation I3.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2004).
7

8

CECH, supra note 1,at 18 1.

Lee P. Breckenridge, Maintaining Instream Flow and ProtectingAquatic Habitat: Promise
and Perils on the Path to Regulated Riparianism, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 595, 612-19 (2004).
9

10

See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Pennsylvania, in 6 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS 713, 713-26

(Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 ed., repl. vol. 1994). Large withdrawals are regulated by the Susquehanna River Basin Commission and the Delaware River Basin Commission. Two compacts allow
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of alternative allocation regimes are slowly beginning to surface in the two
states.' Given the state's abundance of water, the lack of regulation is not surprising. The most serious water issues in West Virginia have long been too
much water12 and pollution abatement.1 3 However, the state is discovering that4
there may be potential long-term costs to the failure to control access to water.'
Water use remains under regulated in West Virginia compared to her immediate
neighbors such as Kentucky and Virginia, as well as other eastern and southeastern states. West Virginia's legislature took the first step toward greater
regulation in 2003 by requesting the creation of a water policy commission.' 5
The commission was created in March of 2003.
As competing demands for different uses intensify, the lack of an effective regulatory scheme makes it increasingly difficult to accommodate new
competing demands and to create a framework to adjust to shortages. Shortages
have generally been relatively short-lived in the East, but a recent survey of state
water managers listed West Virginia as one of sixteen states which expect regional shortages to occur. 16 The lack of an effective regulatory policy also encourages intra-state jurisdictional conflicts, which may result in the inefficient
allocation of water.' 7 In addition to these relatively immediate problems, the
lack of a regulatory framework makes it more difficult for the state to develop
the commissions to issue withdrawal permits in protected areas if the state does not have a permit
system. See Delaware River Basin Compact, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6501 (2001); Susquehanna
River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 91-575, art. 11, 84 Stat. 1509, 1523-24 (1970). In 2002, Pennsylvania passed a Water Resources Planning Act, which requires the preparation of a state water
plan. See 27 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3101-3136 (West 1997 & Supp. 2003).
1 See 27 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3101-3136.
See, e.g., Uhl v. Ohio River R.R., 49 S.E. 378 (W. Va. 1904) (finding the railroad liable for
construction of embankment that caused flooding because ordinary flood overflow determined to
be part of the river; thus, the rule that a riparian cannot interfere with the flow of a watercourse if
it causes flood or erosion damage to other riparians applied).
13 For example, as of December 2002, West Virginia had 722 impaired waters. EPA, TOTAL
12

MAXIMUM

DAILY LOADS,

reprinted

in

ROBERT L.

GLICKSMAN

ET AL.,

ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION LAW AND POLICY 586-87 (4th ed. 2003); see also M. Ann Bradley & Joesph M. Dawley, West Virginia's Antidegradation Policy for State Waters: From Theoretical Construct to
Implementation Procedures, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 331 (2001). By June 20, 2003, the number of
impaired waters reported in West Virginia equaled 1,152. EPA, TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOADS,
at http:/lwww.epa.gov/OWOW/tmdl/index.html (approved June 20, 2003).
14
Dr. Robert Behling, Professor of Geology, West Virginia University, Address at the Water
Issues in the Appalachian Region Symposium (Oct. 2, 2003).
15 See S. Con. Res. 27, 78th Leg. Sess. (W. Va. 2003).
See Joan Lowy, Most States Predict Water Shortages in Next Decade, July 10, 2003, at
http://www.awwaneb.org/articles/2003%20news/watershortage.html.
17
Local communities in Pennsylvania are increasingly enacting anti-export ordinances. See
Levin v. Bd. of Supervisors, 669 A.2d 1063 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995), affd per curiam, 689 A.2d
224 (Pa. 1997).
16
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and implement a water resources policy that ensures that the resource will be
effectively conserved for the use and enjoyment of future generations.
This Article approaches the question of water law reform in West Virginia from a broad, future-oriented perspective by putting the traditional eastern
water reform issues in the larger context of national and international trends in
water policy. I argue that water policy and law will be increasingly based on the
ethic of environmentally sustainable water use and development.' 8 This emerging principle will ultimately inform the balance among competing water uses,
the recognition and administration of water use entitlements, the design of new
water projects, and the re-engineering and operation of existing facilities. The
principle of sustainable water use has not yet progressed from a vague, aspirational principle to an operational legal rule. 19 However, one can state with considerable confidence that environmentally sustainable water use represents a
fundamental paradigm shift in society's attitude toward the function of rivers,
lakes, and aquifers. 20 This paradigm shift is, however, occurring at different
rates around the world, and this shift will influence national water laws and
policies.
The consequences of this paradigm shift are substantial because the
achievement of environmentally sustainable water use will require abandoning
the idea that rivers and aquifers are simply commodities to be used to the maximum extent possible through exploitation and manipulation of natural hydrologic regimes. Environmentally sustainable water use is the product of more
than four decades of "environmental accounting" that has led to a more radical
ecological ideal of managing river systems to maximize ecological services, as
well as to support necessary human uses. 2 1 As a result, future water policy will
18

Sustainable development was proposed as a construct to engage developing countries in the

task of protecting the global environment.

WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T & DEV., OUR COMMON
The terms of sustainable development and ecologically sustainable development are often used interchangeably because sustainable development can be defined as "human
development that is ecologically sustainable. Its aims are human freedom, opportunity, and higher
quality of life. It is not another name for economic development, although it includes economic
development." John C. Dernbach, Synthesis, in ENvTL. LAW INST., STUMBLING TOWARD
SUSTAINABILITY 1, 5 (2002).
19 For an analysis of how a "soft" aspirational principle has progressed to "hard law," see

FUTURE 43 (1987).

generally J.B. Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance: Why Should Real-World Environmental
Attorneys Care Now About Sustainable Development Policy?, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 273
(1998).
20
This shift is reflected in the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED) or Earth Summit, which was convened in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992. The Earth
Summit was the biggest and most important environmental conference in history. It sought to
give expression to sustainable development and fulfill its goals of addressing the dual problems of
environmental protection and socio-economic development by producing two treaties: the Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79, 31 I.L.M.
818, and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature
June 5, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, 31 I.L.M. 849.
21
See infra notes 25-33.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2004

5

West VirginiaWEST
Law Review,
Vol.LAW
106,REVIEW
Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 4
VIRGINIA

[Vol. 106

be guided by three general principles: (1) the more efficient use of existing supplies; (2) the use of more sophisticated, less environmentally intrusive technologies to develop new supplies; and (3) the restoration of degraded aquatic ecosystems and the re-operation of existing projects to maintain and re-capture valuable ecosystem services and hydrologic regimes. 2 It will also be characterized
by more inclusive stakeholder participation 2as
water policy is no longer a closed
3
dialogue among engineers and hydrologists.
There is a growing international consensus about the problems that the
planet is facing with respect to water use and how these should be addressed.
This consensus may ultimately filter down to the federal and state level and influence state water policies and plans. This Article examines three interrelated
aspects of this paradigm shift and speculates about their potential legal impacts.
Part II examines the relevant mega international and national changes that are
now occurring. Part III summarizes the legacy of the common law of riparian
rights for modern reform efforts. Part IV takes another look at the long-running
"eastern" water law reform debate and offers a perspective that is somewhat
broader than the conventional one. Part V focuses on the under reformed state
of West Virginia and offers some general guidelines for water resources reform
in a lightly-stressed humid state consistent with the paradigm shift to environmental sustainability. It also briefly discusses some possible reform models
based on the experience of her neighbors.
These mega trends may have substantial, if long-term, legal implications beyond the traditional issue in eastern water law reform. Namely, what
kind of permit system should the eastern states adopt: prior appropriation or a
more flexible, discretionary permit system? The form of any regulatory regime
is, of course, an important issue. However, reform questions must be addressed
in the context of broader national and international trends in water management.
The issue is not simply what kind of permit system a state should adopt, but
what kind of planning, management, and control regime is appropriate to promote the environmentally sustainable use of the state's resources for the foreseeable future in a fair and efficient manner. In addition, the trends suggest that
water use entitlements must be reconceptualized to support any reform effort.

22

Peter Gleick has proposed a similar list for global water sustainability. Sustainable water

management must include: (I) a human right to the minimum amount of water to sustain human
health, (2) the recognition of the need for water to maintain and restore ecosystems, (3) the decreased reliance on structural solution such as supply augmentation, (4) the application of efficiency principles to water use, (5) the more efficient design of new water supply and distribution
systems, and (6) increased non-governmental organization ("NGO") and stakeholder participation
in decision making. Peter H. Gleick, The Changing Water Paradigm: A Look at Twenty-First
Century Water Resources Development, 25 WATER INT'L 127, 131 (2000).
23
See WORLD COMM'N ON DAMS, DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR
DECISION-MAKING,

169-83 (2000) [hereinafter

DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT].
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II. THE END OF THE RIVER MANIPULATION ERA BUT NOT OF
STRESSES ON WATER USE

Interest in water law reform is driven by the fact that the demand for
water is shifting and growing throughout the United States, but the competition
for this essential resource is taking place in a radically different political and
legal environment than it did in the past. In brief, we view water resources in a
more complex manner at a time when the traditional federal role in the construction of large-scale public works is shifting and shrinking and new demands are
intensifying. This section examines four fundamental changes in water policy
that are occurring both in the United States and throughout the world that will
influence future water allocation choices, and suggests some first-order implications of these changes.
A.

The New River Use Paradigm: Fish Parity

Today, two visions of a river are competing for dominance: the managed and the natural or "normative river., 24 From the nineteenth century to the
mid-twentieth century, the dominant view of rivers was that they were imperfect
examples of nature that could and should be improved by human intervention.
We first removed navigation impairments, confined and tamed the flow, and
during the "Big Dam Era" dammed many of them for irrigation and municipal
supply, flood control, and the generation of hydroelectric power.25 In the process, we commodified them.26 This policy produced great local and national
benefits as well as substantial environmental and social CoStS.27 The environmental movement triggered a comprehensive accounting of these costs. United
States water policy is slowly moving from the dominant twentieth-century paradigm of multiple-purpose development through alteration of river hydrographs
to a new, although less well articulated, one of the normative river, which seeks
to use water in more environmentally sustainable ways and to respect the river's
natural hydrograph.2 8
24

See generally Jack A. Stanford et al., A General Protocol for Restoration of Regulated

Rivers, 12 REGULATED RIVERS: RES. & MGMT. 391 (1996).
25 West Virginia still has considerable undeveloped hydroelectric potential. ALISON M.
CONNER & JAMES E. FRANCFORT, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, U.S. HYDROPOWER RESOURCE
ASSESSMENT FOR WEST VIRGINIA (1998), available at http://hydropower.id.doe.gov/

resourceassessment/wv/wv.pdf.
26
The leading articulation of this thesis is WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES INTHE LAND: INDIANS,
COLONISTS, AND THE ECOLOGY OF NEW ENGLAND (1983).
27

See RICHARD N.L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING OURSELVES: A

HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 189-91 (1999).
28
See generally Chris Bromley, A Political and Legal Analysis of the Rise and Fall of Western
Dams and Reclamation Projects, 5 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 204 (2001); Christine A. Klein, On
Dams and Democracy, 78 OR. L. REV. 641 (1999).
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The reasons for the paradigm shift are scientific, philosophical, and
economic. Science, environmental ethics, and economics have contributed to a
new understanding of rivers. As a result of the environmental movement and
the scientists influenced by it, we now see rivers as integral parts of a natural
landscape that can provide valuable ecosystem services 29 along with the historic
benefits of water supply and hydroelectric power. As the great American geographer Gilbert White has written,
People around the world in the 1990s are perceiving the earth as
more than a globe to be surveyed, or developed for the public
good in the short term, or to be protected from threats to its
well-being both human and natural. It is all of those to some
degree, but has additional dimensions. People in many cultures.
. recognize a commitment to care for it in perpetuity.3 °
Rivers are also now seen not only as functioning ecosystems, but also as natural
ribbons of awe and grandeur to be enjoyed in the wild or restored state. The
passage of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act in 196831 marked the beginning of
the end of the Big Dam Era by withdrawing many of the best remaining dam
sites and ushering in a new era of resource stewardship and a recognition that
free flowing rivers are important economic resources.
The major winners of the Big Dam Era were cities, which received increased water supplies and flood plain protection, and farmers, who received
subsidized water as well as flood protection. The major losers were fish and
aquatic ecosystems. 33 Dams, diversions, and levees destroyed fish habitats, but
this was considered an acceptable price to pay for progress, and little, if any,
attention was given to the idea of conserving the benefits of the river's natural
hydrograph. Fish and wildlife conservation meant the creation of refuges adja-

29

See

NAT'L

RESEARCH COUNCIL,

THE MISSOURI

RIVER ECOSYSTEM:

EXPLORING THE

PROSPECTS FOR RECOVERY 58-62 (2002), for a description of the ecosystem benefits provided by
the flood pulses on the Missouri prior to the construction of six mainstem dams from the 1940s
through the 1960s.
30
Gilbert F. White, Reflections on Changing Perceptionsof the Earth, 19 ANN. REV. ENERGY
& ENV'T I, 9 (1994).
31
16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1271-1287 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003). The Act creates a three-tiered classification of rivers: wild, scenic, and recreation. 16 U.S.C. § 1273(b) (2000). As of 2003, there
are 161 designated rivers. West Virginia has one designated river, the Bluestone from two miles
upstream of the Summers and Mercer county lines to the maximum summer pool of Bluestone
Lake. 16 U.S.C.A. 1274(a)(65).
32

See JOHN PASSMORE, MAN'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATURE 32 (1974) (identifying steward-

ship as the opposite of nature domination and arguing that it demands "an active concern for the
earth's fertility").
33
See Breckenridge, supra note 9.
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cent to a river- and the construction of fish ladders,35 rather than habitat conservation.
The newer ecological integrity vision is less clearly articulated than the
multiple use one because it rests on a more complex view of the human role in
the functioning of natural systems. It starts from the premise that we must try to
integrate human uses of a river system with the maintenance of its natural environmental sustainability both in the design of new projects and in the reengineering and operation of existing facilities. The current focus is on restoration because even modified river systems are dynamic, ever-changing, functioning ecosystems that serve a variety of functions from the maintenance of consumptive uses to the production of ecosystem services. This emerging vision is
not a simple river preservation concept because it will be realized, if at all,
within the framework of environmentally sustainable use and development.
River use must always accommodate a sustainable, non-wasteful level of consumptive use, 36 but the conservation of species and of the ecosystem services
that rivers and lakes provide must be recognized as being of equal importance to
traditional water uses, and in many37 cases their value may be greater than existing or proposed consumptive uses.

This "mitigation" approach led to the marginalization of environmental values, and this
legacy is still with us. For example, wildlife refuges can assert water rights to sustain them, but
these rights are hard to claim. The Supreme Court held in 1962 that federal wildlife refuges could
claim implied federal non-Indian reserved rights. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
Subsequently, the Court limited the federal government's power to claim these rights by requiring
that the government prove that the denial of water would frustrate the primary purpose of the
refuge. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978). When the federal government tried
to claim reserved rights for a refuge in the Snake River, the Idaho Supreme Court found the argument that President Franklin D. Roosevelt intended to support a refuge with federal water "inconceivable":
34

The reclamation projects ... assured that there would be sufficient water to
maintain the islands without a federal reserved right ....
The only way that
this reality fails is if there is a catastrophic drought or other natural disaster
that threatens to dry up the river .... It is inconceivable that President Roosevelt in 1937, in the context of the dust bowl years, intended to give preference
to waterfowl, or any other migratory bird, over people.
United States v. Idaho (In re Srba Case No. 39576), 23 P.3d 118, 128-29 (Idaho 2001).
35
The power to construct fish passages around federal projects dates from 1888, but the major
act is the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1934, 16 U.S.C. § 661-666c (2000). See generally 3 WATER RES. POLICY COMM'N, WATER RESOURCES LAW: THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
WATER RESOURCES POLICY COMMISSION 327-30 (1950).
36
This concept was endorsed in W. WATER POL'Y REV. ADVISORY COMM'N, WATER IN THE
WEST: CHALLENGE FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 3-2 to -3 (1998) [hereinafter WATER INTHE WEST].
The Klamath Basin in southern Oregon has been the scene of an intense conflict between
the preservation of endangered species and the support of a traditional, but economically marginal,
irrigation community. See Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Fish, Farms, and the Clash of
Cultures in the Klamath Basin, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 279, 295-300 (2003).
37
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Federal and state environmental laws are slowly redressing this neglect
of the aquatic environment, but in a very ad hoc, piecemeal, and unsatisfactory
fashion. The Endangered Species Act ("ESA") is the major federal environmental constraint on water use. 38 The ESA can preempt pre-existing and federal
and state entitlements, but it is not a comprehensive biodiversity statute. Efforts
to stabilize or restore aquatic ecosystems create substantial pressures to leave
water in place, often quite far down the river reaches. In the end, states will
bear the primary responsibility to do this because they have the primary responsibility to create and administer water rights. The demand to dedicate more water for ecosystem maintenance and recovery is likely to increase in the future
and could constrain the traditional ability of cities to dewater watersheds, put
pressures on existing entitlement holders, and, more generally, increase pressures for more active state water management.
B.

The Decline and Decentering of FederalPower

During most of the last century, the federal government immunized water rights holders and states from the responsibility to make many hard water use
choices. In the twentieth century, the federal government built large-scale water
projects, and with few exceptions, it deferred to state allocation law. This was
the best of both worlds for the states. They were free to control water use, but
the multiple-purpose federal reservoirs took the pressure off of all but the most
arid states to have to worry too much about competition among users and more
efficient water use alternatives.
Until the 1970s, federal and state water agencies along with the major
water users controlled the water agenda, but this is no longer the case. This
tight control depended on the politics of distribution practiced by the federal
government and a few states such as California. The politics of distribution led
to the "pure doctrine of river basin management," which posited the need to
construct and manage comprehensively planned, integrated federal projects on
the nation's large rivers to promote regional development. Proponents of comprehensive watershed and river basin planning assumed that large-scale water
resources projects were necessary to promote the efficient (non-wasteful) use of
water through multiple-purpose projects that would provide widespread benefits
to the nation, or at least stimulate regional growth. The economic assumptions
behind this model were always doubtful, and today water resources development no longer commands the widespread bi-partisan political support that it
once did, although vigorous proponents of the reclamation era remain.
The party is now over. The era of large-scale dam building appears to
be over.39 Some new, "smarter" storage projects will be built, but they will be
38

See Holly Doremus, Water, Population Growth, and Endangered Species in the West, 72 U.

COLO. L. REV. 361, 378-98 (2001) (noting that the ESA may require water to be left in streams to
conserve listed species during periods of peak summer irrigation and municipal demands).
39

E.g., JOHN R. FERRELL, BIG DAM ERA: A LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
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smaller and more environmentally friendly. 40 The United States is moving from
the era of big dams to an era of reallocation of existing supplies and the sustainable management and restoration of previously modified aquatic ecosystems.4'
In the future, water resources policy will be an important component of a larger
environmental-social equity agenda. The traditional government roles of flood
control through dams and levees and supply augmentation remain important, but
they no longer define the governmental interest in water resources use as they
did in the past. These developments will not necessarily directly, immediately
impact state water allocation law and policy, but ultimately they will because
they undermine many of the assumptions behind state water laws and pressure
states to become move proactive than they have been in the past.42
Federal largesse is shrinking, and the federal government's regulatory
role appears to be following suit.4 3 The downward trend of Bureau of Reclamation and Corps of Engineer budgets has been constant in both Republican and
Democratic administrations and Congresses for over three decades. The shrinking fiscal support for water development and the devolution of power has created a more fluid water policy environment. Power is now more diffused, and
the institutions that have managed and allocated this country's water resources
are less able to perform their historic functions of mediating competing demands
for water and buffering all major uses against the vagaries of climate. Today,
growing cities compete with proponents of aquatic ecosystem restoration and
other traditional users such as agricultural irrigators struggling to maintain an
often economically irrational, but deeply valued, way of life. All of these old
and new interests or "stakeholders" now demand a seat in the multi-party bargaining processes that characterize many allocation conflicts. One consequence
of this is that the old idea of static water plans has been rejected. These plans
were prepared primarily by engineers and were often project construction blueprints or wish lists.44 State water planning, for better or worse, must become a
PICK-SLOAN MISSOURI BASIN PROGRAM 147-71 (1993) (noting that the focus on Missouri has
shifted from new project construction to long-term management of existing infrastructure).
40
DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 23, at 236-39. 1 have sketched some of the possible

legal implications of the report in A. Dan Tarlock, What the Report of the World Commission on
Dams Might Mean for the United States Water Community, 5 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 225
(2001).
41
See WATER IN THE WEST, supra note 36, at 3-51 to -52.
42

David H. Getches, The Metamorphosis of Western Water Policy: Have Federal Laws and

Local Decisions Eclipsed the States' Role?, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 59-69 (2001).
43
See Christopher H. Schroeder, Environmental Law, Congress and the Court's New Federalism Doctrine, 78 IND. L.J. 413 (2003).
44
Highly water-stressed states such as New Mexico have begun the difficult process of confronting the question of whether reliable, available supplies pose real limits to future growth. See
Lora Lucero & A. Dan Tarlock, Water Supply and Urban Growth in New Mexico: Same Old,
Same Old, or New Era, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 803 (2003).
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more open, multi-objective process that considers the trade-offs among alternative uses.
The federal agencies have responded by changing their missions from
project construction to "management." The Bureau of Reclamation has formally changed its mission from water development to water management, and
budget priorities reflect this change. 46 The United States Army Corps of Engineers is undergoing a similar but more complex and uneven transition and is
pinning its hopes for future survival on playing a large role in restoring the
aquatic ecosystems that it previously modified. 47 The federal government continues to operate and manage the infrastructure heritage of the twentieth century,
but with increasingly limited ability to augment supplies and sometimes to control the allocation of the stored water. In the future, the federal water agencies
will function more as project managers and as stakeholders in multi-party negotiations rather than as the major policy maker and distributor of federal largesse.
The force of the federal government's shrinking role is illustrated by the
Department of Interior's Water 2025 initiative.48 In response to growing populations fighting for increasingly fixed supplies and the growing number of endangered species versus farmers and cities conflicts, the Department issued a
strategy entitled Water 2025: Preventing Crisisand Conflict in the West. 49 The
strategy proposes six principles for managing water in the future including enhanced water conservation, the greater use of water markets, and improved
treatment technology. 50 The most striking features of the strategy are the absence of a promise of major new supply projects and the reliance on strategies in
which the federal role is limited. In short, the federal government's diminishing
role in water resources management places new pressures and responsibilities on
the states to manage their water resources without the level of federal support
that was available in the past.

45

See David H. Getches, Water Planning: Untapped Opportunityfor the Western States, 9 J.
1, 18-25 (1988).
See BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, RECLAMATION'S STRATEGIC

ENERGY L. & POL'Y
46

A

PLAN:

LONG-TERM FRAMEWORK FOR WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT, DEVELOPMENT AND

PROTECTION
47

See

(1992).

NAT'L

RESEARCH

COUNCIL,

MANAGING

(2004) (on file with law review).
OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE

THE

NATIONAL

WATER

RESOURCES

INFRASTRUCTURE
48

BUREAU

AND CONFLICT IN THE WEST,

INTERIOR, WATER

2025:

PREVENTING CRISES

available at http://www.doi.gov/water2025 (last visited Apr. 1,

2004).
49

Id.

50

Id.
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Growing Cities, FewerNew Reservoirs

Time does not stand still; many urban and rural areas keep growing and
new demands arise. There are four basic categories of water use that will shape
future allocation choices. These are agriculture, municipal and industrial
("M&I"), instream flows, and hydroelectric power generation.
Nationwide, agriculture has historically claimed the largest share of developed supplies, but this use is declining. The story is different for M&I uses.
Nationally, domestic use withdrawals more than doubled between 1960 and
1990, while population only increased by seventy-five percent. 5 1 Domestic
use's growth reflects the new sprawling landscape of office campuses, gated
communities, and golf courses, as well as continued rapid United States population growth, much of it concentrated in warm, water-stressed areas. Nationally,
domestic demands rose from five percent of the total in 1960 to eight percent in
1990, and water used for thermoelectric power generation rose from four percent of the total in 1960 to nine percent in 1990.52 Thus, both domestic use demands and the per capita use appear to be rising.
The end of the dam-building era therefore heightens rather than lessens
competing demands for water. In addition to the demands of urban interests,
more interests will compete for a relatively fixed, even perhaps diminished, pie
in a fragmented decision-making authority environment. Public agencies, nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs"), and water entrepreneurs are all gaining
greater power to control the allocation of water. In addition, water markets and
litigation, rather than federal and state water development projects, will determine the allocation of scarce supplies. However, these will be highly constrained or imperfect markets because of the complexity of legitimate alternative
demands. Nonetheless, they diffuse decision-making authority downward and
stress many state water allocation laws.
The new devolution is on display in Arizona and California. These
states have shifted greater responsibility to local governments and developers to
become active participants in water policy decisions that were previously considered exclusively federal or state functions. Arizona was the first state to shift
direct responsibility to local governments to secure sufficient water to keep Arizona in town homes and malls. The state's 1980 Groundwater Management Act
imposes a duty on all new developments, and thus on their municipal suppliers,
to establish that there will be "[s]ufficient groundwater.., to satisfy the water
needs of the proposed use for at least one hundred years. 53
California has passed similar legislation that more directly links growth
management and water planning, and shifts even more responsibility to cities
51

WAYNE V. SOLLEY ET AL.,

WATER IN THE UNITED STATES IN

U.S.

GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CIRCULAR

1200,

ESTIMATED USE OF

1995 (1998), http://water.usgs.gov/watuse/pdf1 995/html.

52

Id.

53

ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-576(I)(1) (West 2003).
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and developers to find adequate supplies to support new growth. In 2001, California passed legislation that prohibits approval of tentative subdivision maps,
parcel maps, or development agreements for a subdivision of more than 500
units unless there is a "sufficient water supply. 5 4 The legislation also requires
cities and counties to prepare detailed "water supply assessment reports" 55 as
part of the environmental review process.56 Other57areas are considering a formal
link between water supply and land use planning.
D.

Global Climate Change

Global climate change further complicates water allocation by increasing the inherent risks in water rights and hydrologic forecasts. In the water
community, global climate change has been a subject of intense discussion but
no action. There are two basic policy options to deal with the possibility of substantially and adversely altered weather patterns. First, we can mitigate the
cause by reducing greenhouse gas emissions and carbon sequestration. Second,
we can adapt to adverse consequences. Water management falls in the second
category. States are beginning to take the possible hydrologic consequences of
the global climate more seriously 58 as recent weather patterns more closely resemble projected scenarios.
Under our present understanding of the probable fine-scale impacts, adaptation is a daunting task because the hydrological, economic, and political
consequences of global climate change in a given watershed or river basin are
uncertain 59 even as our understanding of the forces that influence climate increases. No consensus exists about the long-term patterns at regional scales.
Some models predict that global climate change may alter precipitation and run54

CAL. GOV'T CODE

55

CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10910-10911 (Deering Supp. 2004).

56

E.g., Santa Clarita Org. for Planning the Env't v. County of Los Angeles, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d

§ 66473.7(2) (Deering Supp. 2004).

186 (Ct. App. 2003) (not certified for publication).
57
See SMART GROWTH AM., PAVING OUR WAY

TO WATER SHORTAGES:

How

SPRAWL

AGGRAVATES THE EFFECTS OF DROUGHT, at http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/waterexecsum.

html (last visited Apr. I, 2004). In 2002, Carroll County, Maryland officials halted all home
construction until 2008 due to a near capacity treatment plant which could support only 62 new
hookups. Mary Gail Hare, Carroll Officials Call Halt to New Houses, BALT. SUN, May 17, 2002,
at 3B.
58
In 2002, the California Department of Water Resources became the first state water resources agency to include potential global climate change impacts in its forecast. See CAL.
ENERGY COMM'N, CALIFORNIA STATE CLIMATE CHANGE ACTIVITIES, at http://www.energy.ca.gov/
globalclimate change/stateroles.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2004).
The gap between what we know and need to know about the relationships between climate
change and human and natural systems is set out in COMM. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
59

RESEARCH, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOME KEY

QUESTIONS (2001).
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off patterns throughout the world. One possible scenario is increased extremes
of wet and dry years. 60 Global climate change's adverse impacts are likely to be
most severe in arid and semi-arid areas because historically variable rainfall
patterns may be altered; increased precipitation may actually exacerbate efforts
to provide reliable water supplies. Warmer average temperatures may cause
spring runoffs to come earlier and evaporate faster, snowpacks to melt earlier,
and more precipitation to fall as winter rain rather than snow. Increased, but
out-of-cycle, rainfall is the projected pattern for parts of the western United
States. Wetter, warmer weather could strain existing storage systems that currently provide reliable regional water supplies and increase flooding. Existing
reservoirs may not be able to capture the increased winter runoff, causing serious shortages in the summer.61
The impact of global climate change for water-rich areas such as West
Virginia may be subtler but could be significant. The most comprehensive assessment of the possible impacts of global climate change in the United States
remains the Clinton Administration's National Assessment. West Virginia is
grouped in the Northeastern United States. Both the two major models, the
Hadley and the Canadian, predict lower than average temperature increases
compared to other regions of the country. 62 However, West Virginia is projected to have the largest winter temperature increases, as much as twelve degrees Fahrenheit, although the United States Environmental Protection Agency
has a more conservative two to seven degree Fahrenheit range. 63 The models
also differ on the projected rainfall. The EPA scenario for the West Virginia
region is surprisingly similar to the one for California, which is causing great
concern in California's water community. California and other ard states are
concerned because increased precipitation could be offset by an earlier spring
runoff. This would increase the risk of lower (and more contaminated) summer
flows, which could be serious in states, such as West Virginia, with substantial
water pollution problems.
60

Joel B. Smith et al., Potential Consequences of Climate Variability and Changes for the

Western United States, in NAT'L ASSESSMENT SYNTHESIS TEAM, U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH
PROGRAM, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON THE UNITED STATES: POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF

CLIMATE

VARIABILITY

AND

CHANGE

ch.

8,

at

219

(2001),

available

at

http://www.usgcrp.gov/usgcrp/Library/nationalassessment/foundation.htm.
61
An early study by an Environmental Defense Fund economist concluded that water deliveries for federal and state water projects that serve California's San Jaoquin Valley could be reduced
by as much as twenty-five to twenty-eight percent. DANIEL J. DUDEK, ENVTL. DEF. FUND,
CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS UPON AGRICULTURE AND RESOURCES: A CASE STUDY OF CALIFORNIA

(1989).
62

Eric Barron, Potential Consequences of Climate Variability and Changesfor the Northeast-

ern United States, in CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON THE UNITED STATES, supra note 60, ch. 4, at
109.
63

EPA,

CLIMATE

CHANGE

AND WEST

VIRGINIA

GLOBAL

WARMING

IMPACTS

(1998),

http://yosemite.epa.gov/OAR/globalwarming.nsf/content/ImpactsStatelmpacts.html.
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III. THE COMMON-LAW LEGACY OF EASTERN WATER LAW

Water lawyers are inherent economists; they are only interested in the
process of competition for scarce resources. For this reason, eastern water has
never been interesting. All states have faced the problems of competing demands and the risks associated with a variable or overused water supply, but
these problems have only been acute in the western states, and only these states
developed "hard" property rights and strong regulatory systems designed to
achieve widespread access to limited supplies and to limit the risks of nonavailability. Eastern states have faced some of the same problems but in a less
intense fashion, and thus developed only "soft" property rights and weak or incomplete regulatory systems. While the western states had to develop a water
law adapted to the region's harsh climate, eastern states have had the luxury of
leisurely pondering the question of whether water law reform was in fact
needed.
Reform has been both hard and easy for the eastern states. Reform has
been difficult because of the nineteenth century legacy of limited government
interference with the use of water. The eastern states adopted the common law
of riparian rights and left the task of allocation to the courts, although there is a
strong tradition of legislative modification of the common law. This created the
expectation that water was an open access commons. Paradoxically, reform is
easier in the East than the West because the East does not have the strongly entrenched entitlements that the West has. Thus, it will be easier to draw on the
long tradition that posits that private use is subordinate to the public interest and
that rights do not vest for constitutional purposes until water is used. 64
A.

The Nineteenth Century Quasi-LaissezFaire Legacy

In the United States, the state interest in water use has been consistent,
but it has often been muted, especially from the mid-nineteenth century forward.
Eastern water law long rested on the assumption that a system of judicially created and enforced entitlements that permit the private and public use of water
will serve society well by encouraging sufficient investment in water-dependent
activities. The primary reliance on private entitlements was a logical outcome
64
The switch from the common law of prior appropriation to a permit system for unused
rights has generally been upheld against takings challenges because almost all claimants end up
with more secure rights, or a long period of non-use negates any legitimate expectations of a water
right. See, e.g., State Dep't of Ecology v. Acquavella, 51 P.3d 800 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that a final adjudication decree bars unclaimed riparian fights even if they were subsequently
revived before the previously announced cut-off date); In re Deadman Creek Drainage Basin in
Spokane County, 694 P.2d 1071 (Wash. 1985) (finding forfeiture of riparian fights was not a
taking); cf Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982) (concluding that unexploited mineral interests may be terminated for failure to re-register). But see Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v.
Okla. Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568 (Okla. 1990) (holding that the legislature may not constitutionally terminate unexercised riparian rights). See generally Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution,
PropertyRights and the Future of Water Law, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 257 (1990).
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of the role that water played in eighteenth and nineteenth century America and
the preference for private rather than public development. 65 Until the last decades of the nineteenth century, the major water uses were non-consumptive:
navigation and small-scale hydropower. Initially, the role of the state was substantial because the common law threatened to retard the desired level of private
investment in mill power, but after earlier barriers were removed, the need for
state intervention diminished.
Starting in the eighteenth century, private choice was limited to promote
use of water to insure that the benefits of water use were widely
efficient
the
distributed in society. 66 The common law of riparian rights developed during
the time in which the most valuable use of water was to power mills, and thus
the most valuable attribute of the right was the natural flow of the river.67 The
common law initially appeared to adopt a natural flow or restricted use rule,
which required that every riparian, except those at the mouth of the sea, maintain the current for all other riparians.68
The traditional story is that most states replaced the natural flow rule
with a reasonable use rule to allow the retentions and withdrawals necessary to
promote larger mills, irrigation, and municipal and industrial use.6 9 The basic
strategy of eighteenth and nineteenth century water law reform was to preserve
the common law, but to eliminate undesirable, inefficient features. The natural
flow or restricted use rule appeared to prevent all impoundments and modifications of the river's hydrograph, and thus would have prevented the development

65

See DONALD J. PISANI, To RECLAIM A DIVIDED WEST: WATER, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY

1848-1902 (1992); Donald J. Pisani, Enterprise and Equity: A Critique of Western Water Law in
the Nineteenth Century, 18 W. HIST. Q. 15 (1987).
For an important counter example, see generally John F. Hart, Property Rights, Costs, and
66
Welfare: Delaware Water Mill Legislation, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 455 (1998), discussing state's
protection of existing mills at expense of more efficient mills that promoted consumer welfare.
This legacy is still with us. In Dorey v. Estate of Spicer, 715 A.2d 182 (Me. 1998), the
67
claimant asserted flowage rights acquired from the purchase of various parcels adjacent to the
original mill property to flood lands on a pond partially maintained by a dam, which dated from an
1839 sawmill. Id. at 183. The court held that flowage rights arose under the Maine Mill Act of
1821, modeled on the Massachusetts Mill Act of 1796. Id. at 185-86. The claimant argued that
flowage rights were a unique type of easement appurtenant, which could be severed from the
original cite. Id. The original mill was no longer in operation and the claimant did not own the
land on which it originally stood, and the court held that any flowage rights that still exist are
appurtenant to the original sawmill lots "and cannot exist apart from those lots." Id. at 186.
In recent decades, the natural theory was occasionally asserted to claim recreational and
68
instream flow rights for aesthetic enjoyment. See Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 234 A.2d
825 (Conn. 1967). Connecticut abandoned the natural flow theory by statute in 1982, in favor of
regulated riparianism. See City of Waterbury v. Town of Wash., 800 A.2d 1102, 1149 (Conn.
2002).
69

See MORTON HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 35-37

(1977).
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of industry. To promote industrial development, Mill Acts70 were enacted giving riparians the power to condemn flowage easements and in some states creating a priority regime to allocate the right to use the flow. 7' Subsequently, the
common law was modified to allow water to be used consumptively and in
some cases away from the river corridor when there was no substantial injury to
other users.72 West Virginia is conventionally classified as a reasonable use
state.73 The recently (and not so recently) decided cases, however, all deal with
the law of surface drainage rather than the right to use water74 for consumptive
uses. The state took the first steps to modifying the common law by creating a
water policy commission in 2003 and passing a progressive water registration
and planning statute in 2004.75

California is the classic case study of this change. The merits of riparian rights were extensively debated in California in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century as the state's irrigation economy developed and threatened to
block industrial and urban development. California courts vacillated between
the reasonable use and natural flow theories and ultimately adopted the natural
70 The Mill Acts date to early colonial America and were an early extension of the power of
eminent domain to private parties to advance a public objective. The Acts allowed a riparian
proprietor to dam a river to create a source of power for a mill. In some cases, the acts provided
for the condemnation of riparian land by a private party. See, e.g., 2 Va. Hening's Stat. 260
(1667). Upstream riparians were damaged either because of a loss of current or because a portion
of their lands was flooded, or downstream riparians who lost power were entitled to a statutory
remedy of damages. Common-law remedies were preempted. Fiske v. Framingham Mfg. Co., 29
Mass. (12 Pick.) 68 (1831). Virginia and later West Virginia adopted Mill Acts, but since the
eighteenth century, these seem to have been used more as a dam licensing procedure to protect
navigation and fish passage than as a compensation mechanism. See Larry W. George, Public
Rights in West Virginia Watercourses:A Unique Legacy of Virginia Common Lands and the "Jus
Publicum " of the English Crown, 101 W. VA. L. REV. 407, 441-45 (1998).
71 See Hart, supra note 66, at 461-69.
72

E.g., Pyle v. Gilbert, 265 S.E.2d 584 (Ga. 1980). However, the watershed rule continues to

surface in new contexts. In 1994, Florida created a commission to review its water management
law, which has liberal transbasin transfer rules. Water-rich counties convinced the commission to
recommend to the legislature that local sources be favored. Before a transbasin diversion could be
authorized, the water management district with authority to authorize the transfer would have to
consider the proximity of the source to the proposed destination and the availability of alternative
sources of water. Two commentators have characterized the recommendation as "a partial revival
of the common-law rule that prohibited the diversion of water to use on nonriparian lands."
Marcia Penman Parker & Sally Bond Man, Water Management Reform: Mission Impossible?,
FLA. B.J., Oct. 1996, at 20, 28.
73

NAT'L WATER COMM'N,

A

SUMMARY-DIGEST OF STATE WATER LAws 789

(Richard

Dewsnup & Dallin W. Jensen eds., 1973); Marlyn E. Lugar, Water Law in West Virginia, 66 W.
VA. L. REV. 191, 197-201 (1964).
74 The reasonable use rule for surface drainage was adopted in Morris Associates, Inc. v.
Priddy, 383 S.E.2d 770 (W. Va. 1989). See also Graham v. Beverage, 566 S.E.2d 603 (W. Va.
2002); Whorton v. Malone, 549 S.E.2d 57 (W. Va. 2001).
75 See infra notes 197-202.
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Utilities were afraid that the natural flow theory would block access to
water by preventing the construction of dams and reservoirs, and contribute to
the monopolization of the resource by downstream users. California voters
amended the constitution to adopt the reasonable use theory. The reasonable
use doctrine replaced the natural flow doctrine and allowed the appropriation of
surplus water, water beyond that used by riparians, for storage and use outside
78
the watershed. 77 Today, it is doubtful if the natural flow theory still survives,
although the United States Forest Service, as a riparian landowner, has been
awarded instream flow rights in California.7 9
Apart from navigation enhancement, the federal government played a
limited role in the nineteenth century. The federal role in water use expanded in
the twentieth century when the ravages of floods and the failure of the states and
private capital to sustain an irrigation society resulted in the federal reclamation
program in the West and the construction of flood control levees and reservoirs
throughout the country. However, the federal role had a limited impact on state
law. Irrigation and flood control projects were constructed "over" the existing
superstructure of state-created water rights, and the assumption was that the
public interest in water use was best served by the federal government backstopping state water rights. During the dam building era, which lasted until the
late 1960s, the lesson that private choice must always be measured against the
standard of social utility remained embedded in water law. However, it was
largely submerged because supply augmentation solved most potential conflicts
through dams and reservoirs and immunized states from making hard uses.
flow.

B.

The Common-Law Legacy

The Mill Acts represented the major legislative reform in the East until
the 1950s when states began a round of legislative modification. Until the midtwentieth century, the state government interest in water was primarily to the
creation of entitlements and to insure that water was never an impediment to
76

Herminghaus v. S. Cal. Edison Co, 252 P. 607 (Cal. 1926).

77

CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2; see Clifford W. Schultz & Gregory S.Weber, Changing Judicial

Attitudes Towards Property Rights in California Water Resources: From Vested Rights to Utilitarian Reallocations, 19 PAC. L.J. 1031 (1988).
78
There is no right to the natural flow under the reasonable use theory. Recreational use and a
limited right to view are reasonable uses, but, to prevail against other users, a riparian must prove
that there has been a total destruction of the use. City of Los Angeles v. Aitken, 52 P.2d 585 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1935) (loss of view). Under the reasonable use theory, a riparian may not claim a right to
the natural or uninterrupted or unaltered flow for recreational use or view. See Intracoastal N.
Condominium Ass'n v. Palm Beach County, 698 So. 2d 384 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Dunlap v.
N.C. Power & Light, 195 S.E. 43 (N.C. 1938); In re Buttolph, 527 A.2d 1147 (Vt. 1987). But see
Alburger v. Phila. Elec. Co., 535 A.2d 729 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (holding that discharge of
imported water into stream violated rights of down-stream riparians to unaugmented flow).
79

In re Water of Hallett Creek Stream Sys., 749 P.2d 324 (Cal. 1988).
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growth. When the states did reform, they retained the common law as the background and default rule. West Virginia has not yet joined the reform movement
and therefore is a classic example of a pure common-law state. This section
examines the basic structure of the common law of riparian rights with emphasis
on West Virginia. Riparian rights are often criticized as unsuited for the needs
of water allocation for two reasons: (1) rights are too inchoate to induce longterm investment, and (2) rights are too tightly tied to land.
1.

Inchoate Rights

Riparian rights are generally characterized as inchoate because it is difficult to predict in advance whether a use will be classified as reasonable or unreasonable. They are inherently unstable because they arise by virtue of the
ownership of land bordering a watercourse, and thus do not have to be put to
use. In theory, a riparian can exercise the right at any time 80 and displace prior
uses. 81 Riparian rights are also difficult to measure in advance because they are
correlative; the amount of water to which a riparian is entitled is a function of
the uses being made by other riparians. Thus, each individual right must be
exercised with due regard for its impact on other users. Starting in the nineteenth century, per se property rules, which presumed injury from any diminution in flow, were replaced with tort-like rules, which compare the reasonableness of competing uses and limit relief to proof of substantial injury. Thus, reasonableness, like nuisance law, is entirely contextual.82 A use only becomes
potentially unreasonable when another user is substantially injured. 83 The balancing test articulated by courts is seldom actually used because it can lead to
unfair or incoherent results. For example, the California Supreme Court once
held that a dam could wipe
out a downstream gravel business because it "sub84
policy."
public
no
serves
The situation with respect to groundwater is worse because the common-law rules all encourage unlimited capture. Most states replaced the "Eng80

Because riparian rights may be exercised at any time, it is theoretically possible for a pre-

sent upstream riparian use to be enjoined in order to protect the future needs of a downstream
riparian use, see Pyle v. Gilbert, 265 S.E.2d 584 (Ga. 1979), but the few dual riparianappropriation systems are limiting this possibility. See, e.g., In re Water of Long Valley Creek
Sys., 599 P.2d 656 (Cal. 1979). The natural flow has generally been replaced by regulated ripari-

anism.
81

Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129 (Ark. 1955).

82

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1979).

83

The importance of injury is illustrated by Edmondson v. Edwards, Ill S.W.3d 906 (Mo. Ct.

App. 2003). The court affirmed an injunction against an upstream recreational dam that dried up a
stream used by a downstream riparian for livestock watering because "[t]he use to which defendants sought to put the stream was not reasonable in that it diverted the natural watercourse on
defendants' property to the exclusion of its long-standing use on plaintiff's property." Id. at 910.
84
Joslin v. Main Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889, 894 (Cal. 1967) (emphasis in original).
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lish rule," which allows unlimited pumping except in rare cases of malicious or
totally wasteful pumping, with the "American" reasonable use rule. 85 In theory,
use is limited to land overlying an aquifer, 86 but in practice the rule allows cities
to transport water away from the aquifer, provided that they compensate small
pumpers whom they dewater. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 858 modified the reasonable use rule and requires large private pumpers to compensate
smaller users when the water table is substantially lowered.87
2.

Water Tied to Land

The common law of water rights is conventionally characterized as a
land-based water allocation system. A riparian right is a natural,88 usufructuary
property right to use a portion of the natural flow of a watercourse. Such rights
are limited to the ownership of land that abuts a stream. 89 The core idea of riparianism holds that in situ uses are the norm and ex situ ones the exception, if
permitted at all. 90 A 1913 West Virginia case held that the use of water on nonriparian land was per se unreasonable, even though the complaining riparian
could not prove any actual damage. 9'
West Virginia adopted the groundwater reasonable use rule, which is different from the
surface water reasonable use rule, in 1905. Pence v. Carney, 52 S.E. 702 (W. Va. 1905). The
reasonable use groundwater rule is not a sharing rule. It gives overlying pumpers the right to
make unlimited, non-malicious withdrawals. Extraction for use on non-overlying land is subject
to either an injunction or the compensation of overlying pumpers.
86
Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W. 2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971).
85

87

See, e.g., Cline v. Am. Aggregates Corp., 474 N.E.2d 324 (Ohio 1984). The Restatement

provides in pertinent part as follows:
(1) A proprietor of land or his grantee who withdraws ground water from the land and uses
it for a beneficial purpose is not subject to liability for interference with the use of water
by another, unless
(a)

the withdrawal of ground water unreasonably causes harm to a proprietor of
neighboring land through lowering the water table or reducing artesian pressure,

(b) the withdrawal of ground water exceeds the proprietor's reasonable share of the annual supply or total store of ground water, or
(c)

the withdrawal of the ground water has a direct and substantial effect upon a watercourse or lake and unreasonably causes harm to a person entitled to the use of its
water.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858 (1979).

88

NAT'L WATER COMM'N, supra note 74, at 32.

The leading West Virginia case is Roberts v. Martin, 77 S.E. 535, 536 (W. Va. 1913), declaring that the right exists jure naturaeas an incident to ownership of a parcel of the land.
90
See Lynda Butler, Allocating Consumptive Water Rights in a Riparian Jurisdiction: Defin89

ing the Relationship Between Public and Private Interests, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 95 (1987).
91
Roberts, 77 S.E. 535.
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The in situ preference is reinforced by the watershed rule, which limits
uses to those within a stream's watershed, or at least gives users in the watershed a preference over users outside the watershed. The watershed rule historically limited use to riparians within a watershed. As a corollary to the natural
flow rule, courts distinguished between riparian and non-riparian uses. All uses
outside the watershed were per se non-riparian and could be enjoined without a
showing of actual injury. The prohibition, which barred each riparian from diminishing the natural flow of the stream to the detriment of riparians downstream from the impairment, has increasingly eroded. Two important New Deal
Supreme Court precedents illustrate. First, Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v.
Federal Power Commission92 held that the Federal Power Act impliedly preempted state water law, and thus Iowa could not apply a watershed protection
statute to bar an FPC licensee from making a trans-watershed diversion. Connecticut v. Massachusetts held that there was no per se watershed rule in the law
of interstate equitable apportionment. 93 Today, non-riparian uses are generally
prohibited only if they injure a riparian use.
3.

West Virginia: The Merits of Underdevelopment

The consistent theme of the limited analysis of West Virginia water law
is that the common law is undeveloped and derivative of other states but consistent with the general common law of riparian rights. 94 In addition, West Virginia case law has remained relatively static.95 This lack of under-legal development is usually perceived as a detriment because uncertainty deters investment in water-dependent activities. However, West Virginia's undeveloped law
need not be a detriment for two related reasons. First, the lack of clarity and
paucity of cases mean that few investment-backed expectations to use water
could have arisen. Thus, the state has a great deal of flexibility to redefine entitlements through a permit system. Second, the lack of firm, existing entitlements gives the state great flexibility to allocate its water between consumptive
and non-consumptive uses.

92

328 U.S. 152 (1946). The result was foreshadowed in Oklahoma ex rel Phillips v. Guy F.

Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941), which held that Congress could construct a multi-purpose
reservoir with disproportionate benefits to the down rather than upstream state.
93
282 U.S. 660 (1931).
See, e.g., NAT'L WATER COMM'N, supra note 73, at 783; Lugar, supra note 73.
95
In 1964, Professor Lugar described the West Virginia law of artificial watercourses as "not
settled." Lugar, supra note 73, at 205. In 1991, the Supreme Court held that the littoral owner of
ninety-eight percent of an artificial lake had the right to exclude the owner of two percent from the
use of his portion of the lake. Ours v. Grace Properties, Inc., 412 S.E.2d 490 (W. Va. 1991).
94
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IV. EASTERN WATER LAW REFORM
A.

Drought and Water Law Reform

Prolonged drought cycles in the East usually set off a round of water
law reform. The specter of prolonged drought is not a fact of life in the East as
it is in the West, 96 but drought episodes do occur. 97 Since the 1950s, many eastern states have modified the common law by adopting some, usually weak, form
of regulation. Over time, the patchwork of new laws has been called regulated
riparianism. 98 At the present time, the approaches taken in the East range from
that of states such as Illinois and West Virginia, which remain primarily common law states, to that of states such as Connecticut," Florida,"°° Iowa,' 0' Minnesota, 10 2 and Virginia, 10 3 which have adopted relatively comprehensive permit
systems. Many other states have more limited, incomplete regulation. Eastern
water law reform inevitably raises the question of whether the eastern states
should adopt the harder property regimes and comprehensive regulation that
characterize the West. The questions in eastern water law reform have traditionally been limited to: (1) whether the state should switch from judicial to
permit allocation, and (2) if so, what kind of permit system the state should
adopt.'04 This section addresses the first issue, and the next section addresses
the second. The case for a permit must be addressed from the perspective of the
user community and the state as trustee for the public interest. The primary case
for a permit system is that it benefits both the user community and the state.
Permits, or water licenses, as they are often called, transform an inchoate and
completely uncertain water right into a more secure one. They also give the

96

For an extensive analysis of the history of drought in the Great Plains and related areas, see

Connie A. Woodhouse & Jonathan T. Overpeck, 2000 Years of Drought Variability in the Central
United States, 79 BULL. AM. METEROLOGICAL SOC'Y 2693 (1998).

97

West Virginia experienced drought conditions in 2001-2002. See Press Release, U.S. Geological Survey, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Drought Extends to West Virginia (Mar. 13, 2001)
http://www.wv.er.usgov/drought/marpress.htm.
98
The term has begun to have judicial acceptance. See, e.g., City of Waterbury v. Town of
Wash., 800 A.2d 1102, 1149 (Conn. 2002).

99

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-365 to -380 (West 1995 & Supp. 2004).

10o

FLA. STAT. ANN.§§ 373.216 to .229 (West 2000).

01

IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 455B.261 to .281 (West 1996 & Supp. 2003).

102

MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 103G.001 to .315 (West 1997 & Supp. 2004).

103

See infra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.

104

The existence of a permit system is the central feature of regulated as opposed to common-

law riparianism. See generally Joseph W. Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, in I WATERS AND

WATER RIGHTS ch. 9 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 ed., repl. vol. 2001).
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state control over new water uses, especially those that threaten to disrupt established use patterns or ecosystems.
1.

The User Community

Given the uncertainty and incoherence of riparian rights, the merits of a
permit system for users ought to be self-evident. As previously discussed, it is
impossible to predict the amount of water each riparian is entitled to use in the
abstract. Groundwater rights are even more uncertain because in many states
there are either no or only minimal restraints on pumping. In contrast, permits
enhance rather than impair correlative rights by firming them up.10 5 Judicially
enforced water rights permit users to withdraw water first and then face the risk
of a lawsuit that seeks to curtail the use. Permit rights provide greater assurance
that future claimants will not be able to curtail or displace an existing use and
better define the drought risks that a permit holder may face. In the West, the
benefits of a permit system have long been accepted and their constitutionality
firmly established. °6 Nonetheless, the adoption of permit systems has been
controversial in the East because the risk of a curtailed common-law water right
has been minimal and the costs of compliance high relative to the perceived
benefits. For this reason, major user groups such as agriculture have long resisted permit systems.
2.

The State Interest

States gain four direct advantages from a permit system: (1) information
about alternative water uses, (2) control over alternative water uses, (3) the ability to balance supply with demand to prevent over-use of stressed supplies, and
(4) the ability to decide what percentage of the state's waters are open to consumptive use and which are reserved for heritage conservation. State control
can take many forms, from monitoring use to planning and management. The
first step in rational water planning is good data that includes the state's average
annual supply and the amount of consumptive and non-consumptive use. For
some states, this may be a sufficient use of a permit system. The most aggressive use of a permit system is to subject new uses and major re-allocations to
public interest review, which is a fairer way to assert the state interest than ad
hoc lawsuits asserting the California-Hawaii public trust doctrine.
The public trust doctrine hovers over many water rights because it permits a court to displace prior uses. Some states, notably California10 7 and Ha-

105

See Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900).

106
See Farm Inv. Co. v. Carpenter, 61 P. 258 (Wyo. 1900) (finding the state permit system was
not an unconstitutional delegation of judicial power to a non-judicial agency).
107
See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
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waii,10 8 hold that vested water rights are subject to the public trust. This judicial
doctrine permits a court to balance the environmental and consumptive values of
water use and, in some states, to require that consumptive uses of navigable
waters be subordinated to the ecosystem maintenance if it considers an administrative balancing inconsistent with trust obligations. The celebrated Mono Lake
case invoked the trust to reduce the Los Angeles Department of Water and
Power's diversions from a tributary of the lake, and Hawaii invoked it to limit
potentially Honolulu's use of water from an abandoned sugar ditch.
A strong permit system also helps shore up state control of transboundary waters, although it can not guarantee such control. West Virginia is a headwaters state. Its seven river basins, the Kanawha, Monongahela, Potomac, Guyandotte, Big Sandy, Tug Fork, and Ohio, drain all points of the compass and
flow into five states. However, "higherority" is not priority. States have only
partial control over waters originating or flowing through their boundaries. Under the law of equitable apportionment, interstate rivers must be shared with coriparians. Thus, each state has a right to use a percentage of the waters. Like
riparian rights, interstate rights remain inchoate until they are quantified by Supreme Court decree through an equitable apportionment, an interstate compact,
or Congressional apportionment.'°9 Equitable and compact apportionments are
governed by federal law. However, the Supreme Court starts from the assumption that existing uses should be respected. Thus, a strong, effective state regulatory program can help to define the state's equitable share, although this is no
guarantee that a state claim will be recognized by the Supreme Court or Congress.
Finally, a permit system can also help a state defend against Dormant
Commerce Clause challenges to its water allocation decisions. The Supreme
Court has further held that water rights are articles of interstate commerce, and
thus are subject to the Dormant Commerce Clause. 10° Sporhase v. Nebraska ex
rel. Douglas invalidates any statute that flatly prohibits all interstate transfers,"' l
108

In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409 (Haw. 2000) (regarding sugar irrigation

ditches in Hawaii). See CAROL WILCOX, SUGAR WATER: HAWAII'S PLANTATION DITCHES 98-113
(1976), for a history of the Waiahole Ditch. My good friend David Callies, Benjamin J.Kudo
Professor of Law at the University of Hawaii, believes this administrative decision poses a substantial risk to urban water suppliers in the state, in effect substituting a preference for aquatic
ecosystems for domestic use. See David L. Callies & J.David Breemer, Selected Legal and Policy Trends in Takings Law: Background Principles, Custom and Public Trust "Exceptions" and
the (Mis)Use of Investment-Backed Expectations, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 339 (2002).
109

See A. DAN TARLOCK, ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ch. 10 (5th ed. 2002).

110

Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).

III

El Paso, Texas applied for a permit to export New Mexico groundwater; New Mexico denied it because state law prohibited out of state transfers. To defend the constitutionality of its
law, the state raised a sophisticated "conservation" defense based upon confusing language in
Justice Stevens' opinion in Sporhase that suggested states could hoard water in cases of necessity.
No immediate shortages existed in the state, but New Mexico argued that it could retain all water
within its borders to protect future generations' community value defense. "Outside of fulfilling
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but it does not per se invalidate all decisions to prefer in-state versus out-of-state
uses."1 2 If a state wishes to defend giving in-state users preference over out-ofstate users, it must have a strong rationale supported by an effective conservation regime.
B.

Why Can't the East Be More Like the West?

Western water law has often been proposed as the model for eastern water law reform. Until the post World War II boom, the West had a massive inferiority problem. The East looked down on it as a semi-civilized place. However, water policy was a different story. Westerners have long believed that
their long, hard trial and error experiments with water allocation give them an
exclusive monopoly on water management and law, and have articulated this
position with religious zeal. All other legal systems are heresy or false religions. To a Westerner, eastern water law regimes are faux permit systems. They
do not create secure property rights because the terms are short and there is a
theoretical risk of a sudden reduction in the amount, which, in contrast to a priority right, is difficult to calculate in advance.' ' 3 The law of prior appropriation
was seen as the only true legal doctrine. All water issues in the humid East
human survival needs, water is an economic resource." City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp.
379, 389 (D.N.M. 1983). No "demonstrably arid" state can meet this narrow standard, so New
Mexico amended its statute to permit extensive public interest review of both intra and interstate
appropriation and transfer applications. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-6-3, 72-12B-l (Michie 1997 &
Supp. 2003).
112 El Paso persevered in its challenge and New Mexico earned a second federal district court
decision, which suggested that public interest review may preserve some degree of state sovereignty. City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 597 F. Supp. 694 (D.N.M. 1984). El Paso argued against
allowing for the risks of shortages; the state again defended its action as the protection of community water values. Id. at 696-99. The district court refused to equate Justice Stevens' necessity
defense with the conservation of supply for future demand and rejected the argument that a state
determination whether the proposed transfer is contrary to "the conservation of water within the
state and is not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare of the citizens of New Mexico" was
unconstitutional. Id. at 697 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12B-1). The district court took a
more generous view of the state's power to prefer its own citizens: "New Mexico need not wait
until the appropriate time and place of shortage arises to enact a statute limiting exports." Id. at
701. El Paso prevailed only on the argument that the statute discriminated against interstate
commerce. Id. The court held that a state may not require interstate commerce to shoulder the
entire burden of furthering conservation and other interests. Id. Thus, the application of conservation and public welfare standards only to out of state transfers discriminated against out of state
users. Id. at 701. New Mexico eventually denied the application because El Paso had not demonstrated a need for the water. In 1989, El Paso started to back away from its policy that Hueco
Bolson water is the only available source of supply, and the city is moving toward a more sophisticated water supply policy that relies more on the reallocation of local agricultural supplies. See
A. Dan Tarlock & D'arcy Alan Frownfelter, State GroundwaterSovereignty After Sporhase: The
Case of the Hueco Bolson, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 27, 35-44 (1990). In 1991, the litigation ended when
El Paso withdrew its state applications. TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 109, at 101.
113 See, e.g., Richard Ausness, Water Rights Administration in the East: A Programfor Reform, 24 WM. &

MARY

L. REV. 547 (1983).
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would be solved if the states would convert to prior appropriation. But the East
has been a continual disappointment to the West. Mississippi converted in 1956
and then apostatized in 1985.114 Other states continually study prior appropriation, flirt with the idea, but never submit to the actual baptism. Influential easterners have long seen prior appropriation as the devil incarnate, or at least as a
primitive, pagan system, and this tradition continues today. 15
All permit systems reflect a tension between the interests of water users
in secure, perpetual, and well-defined entitlements and the state, which may
have a broader perspective. The West has always favored security over broader
interests, while the East has had less need to resolve the tension, but remained
convinced that the West had tilted too far in the direction of security. The heart
of the traditional debate about Eastern water law reform is how to strike the balance between security and the broader state interest, and westerners and easterners continue to have sharp differences about how the balance should be struck.
In the 1960s and 1970s, two reigning titans of water law, Frank Maloney, Dean of the School of Law at the University of Florida, and Frank J. Trelease, the Dean of the College of Law of the University of Wyoming and dean
of western water lawyers until his death in 1986, personified the debate. As an
alternative to prior appropriation, Dean Maloney drafted a Model Water Use
Code, which Florida largely adopted in the 1972 Water Resources Act." 6 Dean
Trelease harshly criticized it in his famous article, The Model Water Code, the
Wise Administrator and the Goddam Bureaucrat.1 7 Dean Maloney dismissed
prior appropriation as inefficient and unfair. He also anticipated the basic environmental criticism of western water law: Too much water is locked into low
value agricultural uses through perpetual permits that give each user the right to
take his full amount as long as senior users are not injured at the expense of instream values. Under prior appropriation, the fact that a stream is dewatered
during periods of low flow is irrelevant; it simply shows the system at work.
Instead, he proposed that water be allocated by twenty-year permits and that
administrators be given the power to reallocate water in times of shortage. To
Dean Trelease, this approach was simply "the substitution of... administrative
uncertainties" for the widely admitted defects
of the common law of riparian
8
rights with no offsetting public benefits."

§§ 51-3-1 to-55 (Lexis 2003).
See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation in the Southeastern States at the
Opening of the Twenty-First Century, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 8, 21 (2002).
114

MISS. CODE ANN.

115

116

FRANK MALONEY ET AL., A MODEL WATER CODE (1972). Florida opted for a regional rather

than state-wide regulatory and planning structure. See Charles R. Fletcher, Florida Water Resources Development: A Callfor Statewide Leadership, 18 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 113 (2002).
Frank J. Trelease, The Model Water Code, the Wise Administrator and the Goddam Bureaucrat, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 207 (1974).
117

118

Id. at 216.
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The first major battleground of the flexible permit versus secure rights
war was the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Most people would classify water
rights as a sub-branch of property, but like nuisance, it is claimed by both teachers of torts and property, and the Restatement of Torts was awarded water. The
case for including riparian rights in the Restatement of Torts is that the few riparian rights cases that involve conflicting claims are damage suits for the loss
of a long enjoyed flow. The common-law reasonable use rule, codified in the
Restatement (First)of Torts, permitted courts to engage in a broad balancing of
the comparative social utilities of the two uses.' 19
Dean Trelease was appointed an Associate Reporter for water rights.
Building on earlier scholarship, 120 he argued that, in fact, courts seldom engage
in such a balancing, and when they do, they often reach arbitrary results 12 1 or try
to use categories such as natural versus artificial to avoid balancing.122 The real
variable, he argued, was often the protection of established uses, and he persuaded the American Law Institute to adopt section 850A, which makes "the
protection of existing values of water uses, land, investments and enterprises" a
relevant factor in the determination of reasonableness. 2 3 He was subsequently
attacked for the sin of sullying the common law of riparian rights with prior
appropriation. 124 However, reasonableness is no longer an open-ended and impossible balancing of the comparative utility of the competing uses, but rather
focuses on the social and economic value of the plaintiff s use.
The issue has become largely, but not completely, moot for three related
reasons. First, courts have not embraced the principle of protection of existing
values, although one can continue to find cases where this is done. 125 Neither
the annotations to the Restatement (Second) of Torts nor a search of electronic
databases has turned up a case where it was applied to protect an established
119

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 851-853 (1938), reprintedin FRANK J. TRELEASE, WATER LAW:

CASES AND MATERIALS (1967).

120

J.H. Beuscher, Appropriation Water Law Elements in Riparian Doctrine States, 10 BuFF. L.

REV. 448 (1961).
121

The leading example remains Joslin v. Marin Municipal Water District,429 P.2d 889 (Cal.

1967), which found no liability where an upstream dam reduced downstream gravel flow because
use of the stream to carry gravel was an unreasonable use, as there was no public policy in favor
of gravel mining.
122
See, e.g., Kundel v. Vir-Jo Farms, Inc., 467 N.W.2d 291 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991) (holding that
livestock watering was a natural use and thus preferred to creation of artificial wetland because the
latter use was artificial).
123

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1979).

124

Joseph W. Dellapenna, Introductionto Riparian Rights, in I WATER AND WATER RIGHTS,

supra note 104, § 6.01(c).
125
See, e.g., City of Waterbury v. Town of Wash., 800 A.2d 1102 (Conn. 2002) (stating that
Connecticut became a regulated riparian state in 1982, but that a city may obtain prescriptive
rights based on "mere presence" of a dam over twenty years because the state followed the natural
flow theory prior to 1982, when the state modified the natural flow doctrine by statute).
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use. Second, the common law of riparian rights is becoming less and less of a
rule of allocating limited supplies among consumptive users. The law of riparian rights is increasingly a law of non-consumptive uses, a law of lakefront
property rights and submerged land development. The cases deal with the reasonableness of pier location, the right to use lake surfaces, 126 and the right to
develop submerged lands. 127 Third, the adoption of some type of permit system
has shifted the venue for many conflicts from the courts to administrative agencies.
The increasing regulation of water use has nonetheless kept the debate
alive. Professor Joseph Dellapenna has assumed the late Dean Maloney's role.
Prior appropriation is portrayed as primitive, inflexible, vigilante law 28 that
fosters premature development, results in an inefficient all-or-nothing result as
opposed to a more efficient risk pooling, 29 and remains unsuited for "an economically mature, humid, eastern state."' 130 It is conceptualized as a system fundamentally different from the regulated riparianism that the eastern states are
adopting. Westerners have taken up the late Frank Trelease's role as the defender of prior appropriation, but the "post-modem" defense is more subtle.
Modern defenders stress that both systems of water law are forms of administrative regulation that create incomplete property rights subject to public interest
limitations.' 3' They also stress that prior appropriation is a flexible doctrine that
permits sharing through transfers and water banks. However, the conclusion is
the same. The East would be better
off with prior appropriation compared to ad
32
hoc administrative reallocation. 1
C.

The DeeperLessons of the Appropriation Versus Regulated Riparianism
Debate

The appropriation versus regulated riparianism debate has broader lessons for the East once one moves beyond the fixation with priority. Many of
these have already been adopted in the East, but there is value in stating them
explicitly.
126 See, e.g., Beacham v. Lake Zurich Prop. Owners Ass'n, 526 N.E. 2d 154 (111. 1988).

See, e.g., City of Orange Beach v. Benjamin, 821 So. 2d 193 (Ala. 2001) (holding that dedicated street adjacent to cove vested riparian rights in city under statute providing that dedication of
property to the public was a conveyance in fee simple, and thus pier constructed by property
owner abutting road landward of cove was illegal).
128
Dellapenna, supra note 115, at 21.
127

129

Id. at 23-29.

130

Id. at 31.

131 See, e.g., George A. Gould, A Westerner Looks at Eastern Water Law: Reconsiderationof
PriorAppropriationin the East, 25 U. ARK. LTrLE ROCK L. REV. 89, 92-98 (2002).
132
Id. at 104-08.
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Geography is Destiny

Prior appropriation is often thought of as being similar to Swiss Wine:
It does not travel well. There is considerable truth in this, but one must distinguish between adoption of the system in toto and adaptation of the underlying
principles of the doctrine to a region of water abundance. Theories of geographical determinism have waxed and waned over the years, but the first lesson
that western water law teaches is that law is a product of the experience of
adapting to a specific climate and landscape. The West had to deal with a variable climate that posed, and continues to pose, substantial risk of long-term
shortages. Intensive consumption was deemed necessary to sustain a region
plagued by boom and bust cycles. The problem was how to develop a rule that
allocated the risk of shortage in a predictable, and thus fair, manner. Drought is
not unknown in the East, but it is much more short-lived.
The eastern states have always had large margins of reserves to offset
the risk of overuse. Nature has endowed the East with sufficient water to maintain ecosystem service and to support considerable future growth. Humid states
can be analogized to "super-clean" areas designed under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration program of the Clean Air Act. 33 The assumption should
be that most of the water will be left in place, and that a relatively small increment will be consumed. In contrast, the West is a Clean Air Act NonAttainment Area. 134 Too much water is consumed given the available supply,
and existing uses must be "rolled-back" to achieve environmentally sustainable
use patterns. The East faces, therefore, the subtler but equally challenging problem of what to do with its unconsumed increments. The lesson that should be
drawn is that the East needs to replace indifference with a more sustainable allocation regime that recognizes that "use" includes both consumptive and nonconsumptive uses, and that the baseline for water management should be the
maintenance of existing flow functions.
The emerging "soft" regime that controls the use of the waters of the
Great Lakes provides an example of the adoption of the existing hydrograph of a
water body as the baseline. Since the 1980s, the Great Lakes governors, along
with their Canadian provincial counterparts, have been trying to develop a regulatory regime to prevent or substantially limit out-of-basin diversions. In the
late 1990s, they hired a western water lawyer who recommended that the states
enter into an interstate compact to allocate the lakes among themselves. The
recommendation viewed the lakes as an open access commons with highly uncertain entitlements and recommended a compact to create secure state entitlements. There is a legal regime in place, consisting of both hard and soft (nonbinding) law, which has the net effect of allocating the lakes almost exclusively
to the existing non-consumptive uses: navigation, recreation, and ecosystem
133

42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-79 (2000).

134

Id. § 7407(d).
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conservation. The regime imposes a high burden on new, especially large, consumptive users to justify a departure from the baseline.135 As the 2000 International Joint Commission report on Great Lakes diversions concluded:
If all interests in the Basin are considered, there is never a 'surplus' of water in the Great Lakes system; every drop of water
has several potential uses, and trade-offs must be made when,
through human intervention, waters are removed from the system. Environmental interests, for example, require36fluctuations
between high and low levels to preserve diversity. 1
2.

Harder Property Rights Are Needed in the East to Prevent the
Tragedy of the Commons

The basic criticism of the common law of riparian rights is that its inchoate nature creates an open access commons. The common law encourages
unlimited present use because the risk of a successful lawsuit by other riparians
is generally small and worth assuming. All critics of the common law agree that
water users and the state would be better off with more certain rules. 137 Secure
water rights promote investment, provide clear default rules for the negotiated
settlement of conflict, and permit the reallocation of water through the market.
The argument that the prior appropriation system creates too inflexible rights is
actually a debate about how best to incorporate the state interest. My argument
is simply that if one accepts the need for some level of greater security in the
form of a permit system, one cannot avoid some form of priority system.
If priority did not exist it would have to be invented. There are few instances in society where we think it fair to just to displace the first claimant with
a subsequent one. First come, first served is a societal norm with deep roots.
When we reject priority, we require a substantial justification. For example, late
arriving elite frequent flyers can sometimes bump early arriving but lower or
non-elite standbys because the airline can create strong investment-backed expectations in the former. Similarly, when we bump a prior water right, it is to
correct a major flaw in the allocation system. The California-Hawaii public
trust doctrines, discussed earlier, illustrate this. In the end, the trust is unlikely

135

See A. Dan Tarlock, How Well Can International Water Allocation Regimes Adapt to

Global Climate Change?, 15 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 423, 437-43 (2000).
136

INT'L JOINT COMM'N, PROTECTION OF THE WATERS OF THE GREAT LAKES: FINAL REPORT TO

THE GOVERNMENTS OF CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES (2000), available at http://www.iigr.ca/

pdf/ documents/ 406_Protection of theWaters.pdf.
137
Miguel Solanes, Water: Rights, Flexibility and Governance: A Balance That Matters? 3
(2002) (unpublished manuscript prepared for Third World Water Forum, Kyoto, Japan 2003) (on
file with the author) (reporting that the lack of secure water rights impeded investment in needed
new agriculture in Zimbabwe long before the present political instability).
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to be invoked only if38 a prior use threatens to destroy an entire aquatic ecosystem
subject to the trust.1
The adoption of any permit system will require the protection of prior
uses. For example, Florida's Water Management Act expressly makes noninterference with the presently existing uses one of the three criteria for the issuance of a permit. A Florida intermediate court of appeals substantially reduced
the amount of water granted to an agricultural user to protect pressure levels in
an existing well field 39from a 1.7-foot drop. Existing users enjoyed "superiority"
over new applicants.
3.

Priority is a Default Rule, Not a Bright Line Rule

The role of priority in water allocation is often misunderstood. The debate about priority enforcement is like the nuclear war debates of the 1950s and
'60s. Endless worst-case scenarios were constructed to plan for different contingencies. Actual cases of priority enforcement do exist, especially during periods of prolonged drought, but in most cases the market or custom is used to
blunt the potentially harsh aspects of priority.' 4° Front Range water users in
Colorado are familiar with the need to introduce flexibility in the priority system. Most of Colorado's compact share of the Colorado River is diverted to the
eastern slope to serve farmers and cities. However, these upstream water rights
are junior to a western slope power plant near Glenwood Springs, and eastern
slope diverters such as the Northern Colorado Conservancy District, which gets
water from the Colorado Big Thompson project, are concerned that the senior
will make a call in a low water year and deprive the project of needed upstream
offered to pay the power plant's
water. The project and the city of Denver have
4'
call.'
the
avoid
to
energy
lost
owner for the

138

State Water Resources Control Bd. Cases, No. JC 4118 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2003),

Proposed Statement of Decision at 80 (noting that the public trust is limited to the failure of any
responsible body to consider the impact of diverting the entire flow of a navigable stream).
139
Harloff v. City of Sarasota, 575 So. 2d 1324,1328 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). See also the
discussion of Edmondson v. Edwards, 11 S.W.3d 906, 910 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003), supra note 83.

140

I developed this argument at length in A. Dan Tarlock, Prior Appropriation: Rule, Princi-

ple, or Rhetoric?, 76 N.D. L. REV. 881 (2001) and The Future of Prior Appropriation in the West,

41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 769 (2001). I now get e-mails from water lawyers all over the West with
examples of priority enforcement.

See, e.g., Irrigators Cut Off from Canal Water, OMAHA

WORLD-HERALD, July 22, 2003, at 2D (reporting cutoff of post-1889 rights holders in Nebraska
panhandle), 2003 WL 5277205.
141

Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, WATER NEWS, Apr. 2003, at 19.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol106/iss3/4

32

Tarlock: Water
LawLAReform
in WestIN
Virginia:
Broader Context
VIRGINIA
WEST The
W REFORM
WA TER

2004]

4.

Water Rights Are Private Entitlements Subject to the Public
Interest

The most important lesson about prior appropriation is that water rights
are not exclusive private property rights; they are not even simply correlative
rights, which require sharing among a limited number of users. Water rights are
limited or incomplete private use entitlements subordinate to the public interest
to a greater extent than other forms of property. 42 The idea that water rights are
different from other property entitlements is widely recognized. Water's special
status is generally reflected in state regulation of the use of the resource. For
historical reasons, these assertions usually take the form of state proprietary
claims, but they are, in fact, assertions of state regulatory power. The public
interest was initially reflected in the rule that all uses must be beneficial or nonwasteful. Non-wasteful use remains the core concept of western water law and
is equally a core component of regulated ripariansim.143 The public interest is
not limited to waste prevention. It is an evolving concept that increasingly requires the more efficient use of water in a variety of circumstances, as well as
4
the consideration of the social and environmental impacts of water diversions'"
and transfers and the conservation of stressed aquatic ecosystems.
There is a great deal of confusion about the form and consequences of
assertions of state ownership. The reason is the nineteenth century legacy of
laissez faire and limited government. Modem water rights are a product of the
nineteenth century, and state power to define and regulate property rights was
much contested as either a violation of natural rights or classic liberal theories of
exclusive, unfettered property. Because water was always incapable of full
ownership, states declared themselves the owners of the resource to bolster their
right to regulate, 145 and this tradition continues today. State ownership is
claimed for three primary purposes: full proprietary ownership, the assertion of
the sovereign power to regulate, and the assertion of the public trust.
The most extreme claim is to assert that the state is the sole source of
the right to use. This can be accompanied by the right to charge for its use as
states extract royalties for the privilege to extract state-owned minerals. However, in the western liberal tradition, state ownership is not traditionally con142

In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 457-58 (Haw. 2000).

143

See Dellapenna, supra note 104.

I" IDAHO CODE § 42-202B(3) (Supp. 2002). The statute requires that the state engineer consider the local public interest in evaluating new diversions and transfers. After courts interpreted
this provision to include secondary impacts, the legislature limited the local public interest to "the
interests that the people in the area directly affected by a proposed water use have in the effects of
such use on the public water resource." Id.
145

See Frank J. Trelease, Government Ownership and Control of Water, 45 CAL. L. REV. 638,

(1957); see also Yanner v. Eaton, [ 1999] HCA 53 (Austrl. Oct. 7, 1999) (holding state ownership
is not proprietary, but an historic fiction for the sovereign power to regulate), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cthlhighct/1999/53.html.
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ceived of as a true proprietary claim but as a sovereignty claim. 146 Nonetheless,
most states, including West Virginia, have used the ownership fiction to claim
the power to regulate access to fish and aquatic life and water use. 14 7 However,
the idea of taxing water extraction has been floated in West Virginia. 48 State
ownership is best characterized as the assertion of state regulatory power, which
confirms that water rights have always been incomplete property rights. 149 It
normally asserts that (1) water rights are limited to the privilege to use water, as
opposed to individual ownership of streams and aquifers; (2) access to water
requires state permission in the form of a permit or license;' 50 (3) access can be
denied if the state determines that there is a "higher" or more efficient alternative use of the water; and (4) reallocations are subject to state review.
It is especially important for West Virginia to ground state control in
state sovereignty rather than proprietary ownership because of the confusion
between state proprietary claims and public rights to use the state's waters.
West Virginia inherited a law from Virginia that allowed the alienation of the
beds and banks of a number of non-tidal but navigable rivers. Thus, public
rights are limited to navigable and floatable rivers,' 5 1 and the state has broad
discretion to alienate the beds of non-navigable waters that it acquired from Virginia as common or "waste or unappropriated" lands. 52 However, state ownership was expanded when the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that
all the beds of post-1863 navigable waters are owned by the state. 53 The net
result is that the state's regulatory power and public recreational rights are still
See, e.g., California v. Riverside Superior Court, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 276 (2000). In this case,
the court held that California was liable for the cost of cleaning up a contaminated aquifer, and the
state sought reimbursement from its insurance carrier. The carrier invoked the "owned property"
exclusion, but the court held that statutory declaration that the state owned the waters "in trust" for
the people did not confer proprietary ownership. Id. at 285-87.
146

147

W. VA CODE § 20-3-3 (2003).

148

Legislation introduced in early 2003 to create a statewide water use plan was attacked by

the state Chamber of Commerce and other business groups as a first step toward the taxation of
water use. See Kris Wise, Lawmakers Discuss State Water Use Study, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL,
Jan. 13, 2004, at PIC. The issue seems to be dead for the immediate future. A statement issued
by a Democratic candidate for Governor, Lloyd Jackson, calls for a state water policy, but not for
taxation or the restriction of use by instate businesses. West Virginia Water Policy for the 21st
Century (executive summary), http://www.jacksonforgov.com/download/water.pdf. (last visited
Apr. I, 2004).
149
See In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409 (Haw. 2000).
150

See

STEFANO BURCHI, FOOD

&

AGRIC. ORG. UNITED NATIONS,

LEGIS. STUDY

No. 52,

5 (1994) (concluding
that the non-regulated uses "represent an ever shrinking minority of water allocation decisions
overall").
151
Gaston v. Mace, 10 S.E. 60, 63 (W. Va. 1889).
PREPARING NATIONAL REGULATIONS FOR WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

152

See George, supra note 70.

153

See Campbell Brown & Co. v. Elkins, 93 S.E.2d 248 (W. Va. 1956).
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tied to the historic classification of the river, 54 rather than to the need for state
regulation. This legal legacy should not be allowed to constrain state regulatory
power over all the state's waters.
The third formulation of state ownership is the idea that all water use is
subject to the public trust. The public trust is an American doctrine that expanded the Roman and English common-law' 55 doctrine that navigable or public
rivers were subject to a public servitude of navigation into a doctrine that limits
the power of the states to grant private rights that threaten to destroy the resource. In contrast to the simple declaration of ownership in trust, which asserts
the fight to the rules for private and public use, the modern public trust doctrine
asserts (1) that existing rights may be curtailed to prevent the destruction of
aquatic ecosystem functions, 56 and (2) that the state has a duty to protect these
values in all actions that allocate and reallocate water. 157 The American public
trust is a judicial doctrine, but other nations have implemented the basic idea by
statute or practice. South Africa has incorporated the public trust into its new
water law by creating an environmental reserve or a cap on diversions. Austra-

154

George, supra note 70, at 437-41, 446-67.

155

George seems to suggest that West Virginia's public trust is more limited than the California-Hawaii doctrine. See George, supra note 70, at 456-58. The West Virginia public trust arises
from Virginia's succession to the English Crown's jus publicum after the Revolution, see Martin
v. Wadell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842), but it permits state alienation. However, the jus publicum is the
source of California-Hawaii doctrine, see Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261
(1997); I1l. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), and a history of state alienation does not
prevent the more aggressive assertion of the trust against water right holders whose rights are
more contingent than those of owners of land subject to the trust.
156 See infra note 157. The trust is a common-law principle and state regulation of trust resources are immune from a Fifth Amendment taking claim. For example, in McQueen v. South
CarolinaCoastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 120 (S.C. 2003), the court held that the state can deny
permits to build on two vacant lots (purchased for $4,200.00) in North Myrtle Beach because the
land had reverted to tidelands over the years due to erosion. The public trust applies to wetlands
created by tidal erosion and thus there was no compensable taking. Id. For good measure, the
court added that nature, not the state, took the land. Id.
157
T.N. Narasimhan, A Finite World, Earth Sciences, and Public Trust, 41 GROUND WATER I1
(2003) ("Governments have a responsibility to protect natural resources from unacceptable
changes as they are put to beneficial use."). The public trust literature is vast. Among the more
important articles are William D. Aiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust: ProcessBased Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine,and the Search for a Substantive Environmental Valve, 45 UCLA L. REV. 385 (1997); Richard L. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of
Propertyand Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA
L. REV. 631 (1986); Erin Ryan, Public Trust and Distrust: The Theoretical Implications of the
Public Trust Doctrine for Natural Resources Management, 31 ENVTL. L. 477 (2001); and Joseph
L. Sax, The Public Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective JudicialIntervention, 68 MICH.
L. REV. 471 (1970). The leading cases are National Audubon Society v. Superior Court,658 P.2d
709 (Cal. 1983) and In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409 (Haw. 2000). See also
WILCOX, supra note 108, at 98-112 (discussing Hawaii's sugar irrigation ditches).
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lia is implementing a strategy to do this in the15 8Murray-Darling basin, although
there is no explicit mention of the public trust.
V. TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE
The best guarantee that water will be used in an environmentally sustainable manner to serve the full range of uses from basic human consumption
to aquatic ecosystem conservation is an effective state water law regime. The
environmentally sustainable use of water resources can be broadly defined as
one produced by resource decisions that set hydrologic baselines for individual
basins to protect their ecological integrity and reflect the full range of consumptive and non-consumptive uses, including the conservation of equity services
and the recognition of equity claims. 159 To implement this concept, national
legal regimes face at least nine major challenges: (1) the allocation or reallocation of water for the maintenance of aquatic ecosystems services and the restoration of degraded riverine environments; (2) the reallocation of water from marginal agriculture to more efficient uses, both urban and environmental; (3) the
protection of rural, generally poor, areas that may face the loss of water and
livelihood opportunities; (4) the protection of minority groups such as indigenous peoples and others who have developed sustainable customary use practices; (5) the limitation of the mining of aquifers; (6) the provision of water in
times of scarcity for a wide range of uses at a time when there is less support for
large-scale subsidized supply augmentation (e.g. dams); (7) the integration of
water quality; (8) the adaptation to global climate change, which threatens to
alter rainfall patterns and create more extreme cycles of flood and drought; and
(9) the development of more adaptive and inclusive decision-making processes.' 60 The system of entitlements that was built up by traditional allocation
158

The agreement imposes detailed land use and water management duties on the basin states

and is constantly amended by new agreements. It both allocates the flow among the basin states
and vests the Commission with the power to control releases from specified upstream storage
facilities. The Murray-Darling Commission now runs the river, overseen by the ministerial council and a stakeholder advisory board. See generally MURRAY-DARLING BASIN COMM'N, MURRAYDARLING BASIN INITIATIVE, at http://www.mdbc.gov.au (last visited Apr. 1, 2004). The most
important potential international precedent is the Commission's adoption of an artificial base flow
regime and the imposition of the regime on existing users throughout the basin. The Commission

has initiated a process to set environmental or base flows for ecosystem restoration based on the
impacts of different flows on the riverine environment. To implement the base flows, in 1995 the
Commission announced a "Cap," which is the cornerstone of a number of policies designed to
better manage water resources. See Poh-Ling Tan, IrrigatorsCome First: Conversion of Existing
Allocations to Bulk Entitlements in the Goulburn and Murray Catchments, Victoria, 18 ENVTL. &

PLAN. L.J. 154, 169 (2001). The Cap imposes yearly diversion limits on the four basin states and
the Australian Capital Territory. Id.
159
This definition was adopted by the United States Western Water Policy Review Advisory.
See WATER IN THE WEST, supra note 36, at 3-1 to 3-5.
160
See FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., supra note 5, at 150-59, for a survey of recent legislation dealing
with these issues.
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regimes is seen as a barrier to this adjustment. Nonetheless, nations around the
world are supplementing their traditional hard or soft property regimes with the
following techniques.
A.

Limitations on Consumptive Use and the Redefinition of Entitlements

The pressures for aquatic ecosystem conservation or restoration and the
risk of supply and demand imbalances require that consumptive uses be capped
or even rolled back. South Africa's reserved environmental flows and basic
human needs and the cap imposed under the Murray-Darling management regime in Australia are significant examples of this trend. These new flow maintenance initiatives have been done within the framework of existing entitlement
regimes, but they have the potential to modify and thus redefine them.
Any limitation regime adds a new element of incompleteness to water
rights that should be explicitly recognized. Water rights have always been subject to the "laws of nature," to the fixed risks of established rules such as priority, and to the correlative rights of other users. These risks run from a complete
loss through capture to post-use sharing. New demands on the system are another risk that entitlement holders face. The inherently incomplete or risky nature of property rights means that the focus should be on the actual expectations
that lie behind a use rather than the perpetual enforcement of the entitlement.
This permits regulators, users, and other stakeholders to explore alternative
ways of satisfying those expectations.161 In some cases, it may be necessary to
substitute "firm" rights for a risk-based physical solution that provides an adequate margin of safety, rather than an absolute entitlement in water-short years.
These new regimes will be characterized by the greater reliance on physical
solutions,162 which include adaptive management and water markets, rather than
the anticipated enforcement of priorities and formal entitlements.
B.

IncreasedAlienability

Water entitlements have often been viewed as tied to a specific parcel of
land, but they are increasingly being made more alienable to correct prior misallocations, primarily the dedication of too much water to low value agricultural
use. Alienation potentially makes water rights marketable commodities, but it is
essential to recognize that water markets are not an end in and of themselves,
but rather a means to the more efficient and sustainable use of water through fair
reallocation procedures. The state should decide the amount of water that is
subject to reallocation, and markets must be closely monitored to ensure that the
161

See Pallazolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (finding this consistent with takings

jurisprudence).
162
Technically, physical solution exchanges wet water for the right to assert water rights that
would promote inefficiency. See Harrison Dunning, The "Physical Solution" in Western Water
Law, 57 U. CoLO. L. REV. 445 (1986).
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transfer of water is not unduly disruptive of local economies and ecosystems,
and that the transfer results in the actual application of water to a productive use.
The Chilean experience with water markets is instructive. Water marketing was
embraced as part of the government's enthusiasm for a full market economy.
However, studies of the operation of water markets demonstrate "that in most
parts of the country water markets have been inactive and have had a limited
impact on the efficiency of water use and the reallocation of resources.
These
16 3
results are due to a variety of constraints and transaction costs."'
C.

IntegratedBasin Planning and Management

Historically, engineers and hydrologists controlled water planning, but
this is no longer the case. Former central water planning exercises, which were
often no more than post-hoc justifications for large dams and diversions, are
being replaced by open, comprehensive planning processes and more holistic,
democratic decision-making structures that feature much more stakeholder participation than in the past and less reliance on a state plan. The report of the
World Commission on Dams, Dams and Development: A New Frameworkfor
Decision-Making, articulates the new template for the future: integrated water
resources management ("IWRM"). IWRM was included in the Agenda 21 - the
environmental action plan for the twenty-first century agreed to at the 1992
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development ("UNCED") and
re-affirmed at the World Summit on Sustainable Development ("WSSD") held
in Johannesburg in 2002. In brief, IWRM calls for the holistic management of
freshwater as a finite and vulnerable resource, and the integration of sectoral
water plans and programs within the framework of economic and social policy. 64 The objectives of integrated water resources management, as authoritatively articulated in Agenda 21, are as follows:
a. To promote a dynamic, interactive, iterative, and multisectoral approach to water resources management, including the
identification and protection of potential sources of freshwater
supply, that integrates technological, socio-economic, environmental, and human health considerations.
b. To plan for the sustainable and rational utilization, protection, conservation, and management of water resources based

163

Carl Bauer, Marketing Water, Marketing Reform:

Summer 2003 at 11,
Resouces- 151 -Marketingwater.pdf.
RESOURCES,

164

Lessons from the Chilean Experience,

13-14, available at http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-

U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-14, 1992, Agenda 21, ch. 18

18.6, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26 (1992), available at http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/
agenda2 l/english/agenda2l toc.htm (last visited March 27, 2004).
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on community needs and priorities within the framework of national economic development policy.
c. To design, implement, and evaluate projects and programmes that are both economically efficient and socially appropriate within clearly defined strategies, based on an approach of full public participation, including that of women,
youth, indigenous people, and local communities in water management policy-making and decision-making.
d. To identify and strengthen or develop, as required, in particular in developing countries, the appropriate institutional, legal, and financial mechanisms to ensure that water policy and
its implementation are165
a catalyst for sustainable social progress
and economic growth.
D.

New Ground Water ConservationRegimes

Groundwater conservation is a major problem in many areas because
the resource is stressed by over pumping, but it is more difficult to regulate.
First, the articulated conservation standard, safe yield of a basin or aquifer, is
not a simple scientific standard but rather requires complex decisions about the
long-term water budget of the system. Second, the adverse impacts of pumping
on aquifers and related surface streams materialize over long-time horizons
compared to the adverse impacts of many surface withdrawals. Third, and related, it is more difficult to incorporate use limitations into groundwater rights
compared to surface rights.
The challenge for regulators is: (1) to assemble the necessary information to understand the impacts of groundwater pumping; (2) to integrate ground
and surface rights; (3) to limit the excessive mining (i.e. extraction in excess of
an agreed upon recharge rate) of aquifers, which may require that some basins
be closed to new wells; and (4) to insure that groundwater pumping does not
impair the quality of the aquifer. This is a particular problem in coastal areas
where pumping may create a cone of depression, which causes salt water intrusion into an aquifer.166 At a minimum, states need the authority to define the
sustainable yield basins, 67to limit unsustainable withdrawals, and to coordinate
ground and surface uses. 1

165

Id.

166

See TARLOCK ET AL., supra

167

See, e.g., N.C.

note 109, at 532-46.

GEN. STAT. ANN.

§ 143-215.13 (2003).
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The Integrationof Water Quantity and Quality

The regulation of water quality has traditionally been considered a separate activity from water allocation.168 Water quality regulation limits what can
be put into a stream, and water allocation law limits what can be taken out of a
stream. Of course, the two are connected. Justice O'Connor has characterized
the distinction as "artificial."' 169 Water quality is measured by compliance with
water quality standards. The technology-forcing regulations are simply the most
effective way to ensure compliance with these standards. The maintenance of
water quality standards assumes some170 minimum flow levels, and thus withdrawals can compromise water quality.
The logic of the connection is clear, and a few courts have held that new
withdrawals must be measured by their water quality as well as quantity impacts,17 1 but courts and legislatures have resisted incorporating water quality
impacts into allocation decisions. 172 When the progressive Washington Department of Ecology began to condition appropriation permits to maintain state water quality standards, the legislature quickly stopped this heresy.
VI. MODELS OF STATE REGULATION

Eastern water reform ranges from comprehensive water permit and
planning regimes to more limited modifications of the common law to address
specific problems. Several model comprehensive water codes have been proposed, 173 but only a few states such as Florida 174 and Iowa 175 have adopted detailed, comprehensive permit systems. However, only Florida has used its code
168

See

DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CONTROLLING WATER USE: THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF

WATER QUALITY PROTECTION (1991).
169

PUD No. I of Jefferson County v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 719 (1994).

170

See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that the Clean

Water Act does not allow dischargers to obtain a credit for discharging into clean water).
1
The leading case is United States v. State Water Resources Control Board, 227 Cal. Rptr.
161 (Ct. App. 1986).
172 See, e.g., City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrig. Co., 926 P.2d 1, 90-93 (Colo. 1996) (holding that
appropriation has no basis to object to an exchange agreement that reduced flows available to
dilute its discharge).
173
See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Adapting Riparian Rights to the Twenty-First Century, 106 W.
VA. L. REV. 539, 583-86 (2004).
174
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 373.012 to .71 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004). Intense conflicts usually
associated with the West have been created by the state's explosive growth, flat terrain, and the
imbalance between the North as the source of most water and the South as the home to most people. See Abby Goodnough, Developers Urge Support for Water Transfer to Populous South,
N.Y.TiMES, Sept. 27, 2003, at A8.
175
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 455B.261 to .281 (West 1997 & Supp. 2003).
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for substantial water use regulation, 76 although such use of the codes is increasing. The 1997 Regulated Riparian Model Water Code drafted by the American
Society of Civil Engineers remains the gold standard.'1 7 No state has adopted it,
and most have elected to preserve the common law and deal with specific problems. For example, Virginia leaves riparian rights in place except as modified
by the surface water management area permits. 78 State laws can be classified as
follows.
A.

Information and Reserve Authority

The major function of many eastern permit programs is to collect information about water use. They also function as reserve authority that can be
used if needed to limit water uses. Kentucky's water code fits this model. During the perceived height of the dam building era, the state enacted a water permit system in 1966 as part of legislation intended to promote state water resources planning and development. 79 The permit system is incomplete because
it exempts all agriculture, including irrigation, all domestic use, and withdrawals
for certified steam electric power plants. 80 The chief purpose of the system is
to gather accurate information about water use. For example, in 1998, the statute was amended to create a groundwater monitoring network. 18' Maryland has
a similar permit program that exempts agriculture withdrawals below 100,000
gallons per day and limits the duty to apply for a permit to "any plant, building,
or structure which may appropriate or use any waters of the State
.
,,8"The
83
groundwaters.1
and
surface
to
equally
applies
program
permit

176 See FLA. STAT. ANN.

§§ 373.042 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004); Richard Hamann, Law and

Policy in Managing Florida's Water Resources, in WATER RESOURCES ATLAS OF FLORIDA (Ed-

ward A. Fernald & Elizabeth D. Purdam eds., 1998 (stating that the code has not fulfilled one of
its original objectives, the establishment of minimum flows). The legislature amended the Code
in 1997 to make it more difficult to establish minimum stream flows. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §
373.0831(3) (West 2000).
177 AM. SOC'Y OF CIVIL ENG'RS, THE REGULATED RIPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE (Joseph
W.
Dellapenna ed., 1997); see also Robert E. Beck, The Regulated Riparian Code: Blueprint for
Twenty First Century Water Management, 25 WM. & MARY L. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 113

(2000).
178 VA. CODE ANN.

§ 62.1-253

(Michie 2001).

179 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 151.10 to .990 (Michie 2001 & Supp. 2003). Tennessee adopted a

water registration statute in 2002. TENN. CODE ANN.

§§ 69-8-301 to -309.

180 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151.140.
181

Id. § 151.620 to .629.

182

MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 5-502(n) (Supp. 2003). Agriculture users, however, have the

option of applying for a permit. Id. § 5-502(c)(2).
183 Id. § 5-502(n).
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Regulation Specific Problems of Basins

Many states have selectively chosen to remove some of the per se barriers of the common law, such as the watershed limitation,' 84 or to regulate only
specific basins. For example, Kentucky has created a special authority for the
Kentucky River Basin with the power to assess fees for water use. "' The primary purpose of the fees is to maintain the navigation system, but the authority
has broad planning powers, including the authority to develop drought management plans. Virginia has created commissions in several basins, such as the
Roanoke, that have no regulatory authority 86 but are intended to "facilitate
communication among
stakeholders .. .and to maximize participation by all
' 87

interested parties."'
C.

Short-Term Curtailmentin Stressed Areas

Many eastern states reserve regulation for drought conditions or stressed
areas. These laws enable the state to identify areas where use may exceed available supplies, watersheds, and groundwater basins, and to limit withdrawals
during drought periods or in basins where withdrawals may exceed the renewal
rates. North Carolina authorizes the establishment of surface and groundwater
"capacity use areas" when ground and surface uses require coordination or when
withdrawals may exceed renewal or replenishment rates. 88 Virginia permits the
establishment of ground water management areas. 189 Once an area is established, a permit is required for withdrawals in excess of 300,000 gallons per
month. 90 Existing users are protected; permits must be issued based on past
use,191 but the past use can be curtailed if there are demonstrated conservation
savings.
184 See George William Sherk, Meeting of Waters: The Conceptual Confluence of Water Law
in the Eastern and Western States, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Spring 1991, at 3.
185

See Ky. River Auth. v. City of Danville, 932 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that

fees are dedicated to specific water conservation objectives and thus are not invalid taxes).
186 See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-69.39 (Michie Supp. 2003).
187

Id. § 62.1-69.40.

188 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-215.13 (2003); see also High Rock Lake Ass'n v. N.C. Envtl.

Mgmt. Comm'n, 276 S.E.2d 472 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that the Commission has discretion not to declare a capacity use area when nuclear power plant's proposed withdrawals would
have slight water quality impacts and no water supply impacts, assuming compliance with conditions imposed on permit).
189 VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-257(4)(B) (Michie 2001).
190 Cf id. § 62.1-259(i) (not requiring permit when withdrawing less than 300,000 gallons a
month).
191 See id. § 62.1-261 (permitting consecutive twelve-month withdrawals for the past five years
for all uses except agricultural withdrawals, which have a right to consecutive twelve-month with-
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Virginia has gone further and has linked water use and aquatic ecosystem protection. In 1989, the state was given the power to designate surface water management areas. The designation criteria are broad. The State Water
Control Board must only find that water levels are "potentially adverse to public
welfare, health and safety."' 92 Once an area is designated, the state may regulate
withdrawals. 93 However, the authority is riddled with exemptions. 194 The most
innovative part of the legislation is the state's power to afford some protection
to instream uses. Instream uses may be balanced against off-stream uses "so
that the welfare of the citizens of the Commonwealth is maximized without imposing unreasonable burdens on any individual water user or water-using
group."' 95 A similar regime for stressed groundwater-dependent areas was
added in 1992.196
VII. CONCLUSION
In March 2004, West Virginia passed a progressive "first step" water
registration and planning statute. 197 The statute declares that "[t]he waters of the
state of West Virginia are hereby claimed as valuable public natural resources
held by the state for the use and benefit of its citizens. The state shall manage its
waters effectively for present and future enjoyment and for the protection of the
environment."' 198 The statute's equal focus on consumptive and nonconsumptive uses is embedded in the definition of beneficial use, which includes all the traditional consumptive uses as well as recreation, navigation,
preservation of fish and wildlife habitat, and cultural and aesthetic values. 199
Water use is still governed by the common law of riparian rights, 2°° but users
drawals for the past ten years).
192
Id. § 62.1-242.
193

Id. § 62.1-247.

194
Id. § 62.1-243 (including as exemptions: (1) withdrawals less than 300,000 gallons per
month, (2) municipal or privately owned water company withdrawals in existence in 1989 and
which do not exceed the grandfathered rate, (3) future withdrawals that received a section 401
certification under the Clean Water Act, and (4) all beneficial consumptive uses in existence in
1989, provided that the grandfathered rate is not increased).

Id. § 62.1-248.
196 Id. § 62.1-254 to -270.
195

197 Water Resources Protection Act, S. 163, 79th Leg. Sess., (W. Va. 2004) (to be codified at
W. VA. CODE § 22-25-1 to -6 (2004)).
198
Id. § 22-25-3 (to be codified at W. VA. CODE § 22-25-3).
199
200

Id. § 22-25-2(a) (to be codified at W. VA. CODE § 22-25-2(a)).
Id. § 22-25-1(2) (to be codified at W. VA. CODE § 22-25-1(2)).
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consuming over 750,000 gallons per month must register their use.2° 1 After
withdrawal and other information about stream flow conditions has been collected, the Secretary of the Department of Environmental Protection must synthesize it, identify "any area of concern regarding historical or current conditions that indicate a low flow condition or where drought or flood has occurred
or is likely to occur that threatens the beneficial use of surface water or groundwater in the area,, 20 2 and report to a newly created joint legislative water resources oversight commission. 203
Water use has emerged as a major global issue because there is a great
deal of worldwide concern about the sustainability of the planet's water resources. In general, this attention is welcome because it helps to build support
for more sustainable use strategies. However, the current attention has also produced a great deal of excess, abstract crisis rhetoric. The reality is that water
use problems are place-specific. The geographic boundaries of the appropriate
place are often vague, do not respect political boundaries, and are broader than
users and regulators had traditionally assumed - but they exist. Water law reform must first define the geographical scope of the jurisdiction's important,
potential water use impacts and then craft appropriate regulatory responses to
the problem at hand.

201

Id. § 22-25-3(c) (to be codified at W. VA. CODE § 22-25-3(c)).

202

Id. § 22-25-30)(4) (to be codified at W. VA. CODE § 22-25-30)(4)).

203

Id. § 22-25-5 (to be codified at W. VA. CODE § 22-25-5).
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